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FREE SPEECH, WORLD WAR I, AND




The Supreme Court did not explicitly decide a First Amendment
free-expression case until the World War I era. The Court then issued a
flurry of decisions under the Espionage Act of 1917 and its 1918
amendments.1 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote opinions for
unanimous courts in three of the first four cases, affirming convictions
and repeatedly concluding that the First Amendment did not protect the
various defendants' words (in the fourth case, a unanimous Court
"[d]ismissed for want of jurisdiction"). But in the next case, Abrams v.
United States,3 Holmes dissented, arguing that the defendants' writings
should be constitutionally protected.4 Years later, a majority of justices
vindicated Holmes's minority position, and free expression became a
constitutional "lodestar." 5
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct
Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. This article is derived in
part from a forthcoming book: Free Expression and Democracy in America: A
History (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2008).
1. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 40 Stat. 217.
2. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Louis D. Brandeis
wrote the opinion in the dismissed case, Sugarman v. United States. 249 U.S. 182
(1919) (alteration added).
3. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
4. Id. at 624-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of
Free Speech In Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 301 (1996)
[hereinafter White, Comes of Age]. Other helpful sources on free expression, in
general, include the following: MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY
SPARKS: FREEDOM OF ExPREssION IN MODERN AMERICA (Oxford Univ. Press 1992);
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Did Holmes's Abrams dissent manifest a change in his free-
speech jurisprudence? Scholars have fallen into two camps. One argues
that Holmes consistently followed a single principle of free expression;
he voted differently in Abrams because of its distinctive facts. The
second camp argues that Holmes altered his concept of free speech,
moving from a narrow to a broad definition in Abrams. Thus, one
scholar concludes that "the evidence shows without much doubt that
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE:"
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Duke Univ. Press
2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]; MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE
SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (Univ. Cal. Press
1991); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-32 (Univ.
Chi. Press 1958); PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (W.W. Norton & Co. 1979); RICHARD POLENBERG,
FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH
(Viking Penguin 1987); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) [hereinafter RABBAN, FORGOTTEN]; GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (W.W. Norton 2004); PATRICK
S. WASHBURN, A QUESTION OF SEDITION: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
INVESTIGATION OF THE BLACK PRESS DURING WORLD WAR II (Oxford Univ. Press
1986); Thomas A. Lawrence, Eclipse of Liberty: Civil Liberties in the United States
During the First World War, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 33 (1974); David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207 (1983)
[hereinafter Rabban, Emergence]; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive
Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REV. 951 (1996) [hereinafter Rabban, Progressive];
Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (2003) [hereinafter Stone, Espionage]; Geoffrey
R. Stone, The Origins of the "Bad Tendency" Test: Free Speech in Wartime, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 411 [hereinafter Stone, Origins]; Christina E. Wells, Discussing the
First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1566 (2003); G. Edward White, Justice
Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human
Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391 (1992) [hereinafter White, Justice Holmes];
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (Henry Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 1973) [hereinafter COMMAGER]; LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]; THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. Gov't Printing Office
1878) [hereinafter POORE].
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Holmes's views did not change, ' 6 while another scholar insists that
Holmes changed "dramatically.",
7
Both of these opposed outlooks are too simplistic; they tell only
part of the story. They must be synthesized to illuminate Holmes and his
contributions to free expression. Such a synthesis requires an
appreciation of two viewpoints: an external and an internal. From an
external vantage, Holmes transformed. His votes and opinions in the
first cases cannot be reasonably reconciled with his Abrams dissent. Yet,
from an internal standpoint, Holmes himself never believed he had
6. Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression,
1991 SuP. CT. REV. 303, 304 (1991).
7. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1311. Compare David S. Bogen, The
Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 99
(1982) (arguing that Holmes changed before Schenck, but not between Schenck and
Abrams), and Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2358 (2000) (arguing that Holmes
recognized a fundamental difference between Schenck and Abrams that justified his
contrasting votes), with ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE,
WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 75-76 (Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (arguing
that Holmes changed), and PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS (Basic Books 2004) (arguing that Holmes's
Abrams opinion was "a reversal of his earlier position"), and Stone, Origins, supra
note 5, at 607 n.314 (arguing that Holmes "substantially changed his position in
Abrams"), and Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 726
(1975) (arguing that Holmes changed), and Douglas Laycock, The Clear and
Present Danger Test, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 161, 171-74 (2000) (arguing that Holmes
changed), and White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 409-28 (arguing that Holmes
changed).
In addition to sources already cited concerning Holmes, I will cite to the
following: I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI]; II HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-
1932 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1941) [hereinafter HOLMES-
POLLOCK]; Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 Sup. CT. REV.
1 (2004); Gerald Caplan, Searching for Holmes Among the Biographers, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 769 (2002) (book review); Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger Test for Free
Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971); Yosal Rogat & James M.
O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion-The Speech Cases, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1349 (1984).
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changed. He insisted that he had always been firmly committed to free
speech and a free press. This Article explains how and why Holmes
transformed decisively, yet how and why he sincerely denied doing so.
By resolving this Holmesian puzzle, this Article throws light onto the all-
important Free Speech and Free Press cases from the First World War.
Why did a majority of justices consistently find expression unprotected?
And why did Holmes, together with Justice Louis D. Brandeis, start to
interpret the First Amendment more broadly?
Many scholars have misunderstood Holmes and the World War I
free-expression cases because they failed to grasp the connection
between democracy and free expression. This assertion might be
surprising. After all, after World War II, it became commonplace to
insist that free expression is a prerequisite for democracy. But the
concept of democracy itself changed between the two world wars. When
late twentieth-century scholars emphasize that democracy does not exist
without free expression, they conceive of democracy in pluralist terms:
democratic processes, including free speech and writing structure
supposedly fair and open political battles in which citizens and societal
groups compete to satisfy their preexisting interests and values.9 But
from the outset of nationhood through the 1920s, American governments
were understood to be republican rather than pluralist democracies.' 0
8. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT, 26-27 (Harper & Brothers 1948); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech
and the Argument from Democracy, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: NOMOS XXV 241,
241-42 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1983).
9. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (Yale Univ. Press 1989)
(discussing ways to prevent control of democratic institutions by political elites);
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (Univ. Chi. Press 1956)
(discussing Madison's concerns about protecting the political minority from the
majority); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 117-18, 133, 149-
50 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (discussing the emergence of pluralist political theory
and its impact on judicial interpretation).
10. N.C. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore, supra note 5, at 1409; PA.
CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 Poore, supra note 5, at 1540. For more complete
discussions of the differences between republican democracy and pluralist
democracy, see also Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different
Democratic Regimes, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 50-62 (2006); Stephen M. Feldman,
The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme
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Citizens and governmental officials were to be imbued with civic virtue,
which theoretically led them to pursue the common good rather than
"private and partial interests."'1 As would be true with pluralist
democracy, republican democracy was entwined with free expression,
but republican democracy had different implications.
In the republican democratic regime, individual liberties
generally were of the utmost importance and were protected from undue
governmental interference, but such liberties were always subordinate to
the government's power to act for the common good. 12 Any individual
right or liberty could be sacrificed for the benefit of the community.
13
These republican democratic principles informed the legal doctrine of
free expression. Like other liberties, free expression was protected, but
courts developed a legal standard, the "bad tendency" test, that accounted
for the governmental power to pursue the common good. Numerous
state and federal courts held that, while the government could not impose
prior restraints on expression, it could impose criminal penalties for
speech or writing that had bad tendencies or likely harmful14
consequences. The criminal punishment of expression with bad
tendencies would, in theory, further the common good. Many courts
added that a criminal defendant, to be convicted for spoken or written
words, must also have intended harmful consequences. Even so, under
the doctrine of constructive intent, the courts typically reasoned that a
Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431,
433-43 (2006).
11. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, 59 (Univ. N.C. Press 1969). The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for
example, stated: "Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection,
safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or
private interest of any one man, family, or class of men." Mass. Const. (1780),
reprinted in 1 Poore, supra note 5, at 956, 958.
12. James Kent explained that "private interests must be made subservient to
the general interests of the community." James Kent, 2 COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 276 (1827; Legal Classics Library Reprint 1986).
13. See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Univ. N.C. Press 1996)
(describing how government regulated in the antebellum nineteenth century).
14. See, e.g., Knowles v. United States, 170 F. 409 (8th Cir. 1909); Castle v.
Houston, 19 Kan. 417 (1877); Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1860); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824);
Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811).
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defendant was presumed to have intended the natural and probable
consequences of his or her statements. If a defendant's expression was
found to have bad tendencies, then the defendant's criminal intent would
be inferred.15
Part I of this Article describes the Supreme Court's doctrinal
approach in its pre-World War I free-expression cases. Part II discusses
the government's suppression of dissident expression during the war.
Part III examines the first set of Espionage Act cases to reach the Court,
while Part IV focuses on the emergence of a civil libertarian movement.
Part V explores Holmes' change, as revealed in Abrams. Part VI, the
Conclusion, uses a final set of World War I cases to compare Holmes'
and Brandeis' respective stances on free expression. Ultimately,
Brandeis' strong commitment to protecting civil liberties highlights
Holmes' ambivalence toward free expression and its constitutional
protection.
I. EARLY SUPREME COURT FREE-EXPRESSION CASES
The Supreme Court of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries was no more protective of free expression than were other
courts. Before World War I, the Supreme Court did not find any speech•16
or writing to be constitutionally protected from criminal punishment.
Numerous times, the Court effaced potential free-expression problems.
As was true with other jurists, the justices often subsumed free-
expression issues within a due-process or economic-liberty analysis. For
example, early in the twentieth century, attempts to regulate the new
technology of motion pictures raised novel free-expression questions.
The state of Ohio, in one instance, required that a censorship board pre-
approve any movies before they could be shown to the public. In a case
decided in 1915, Mutual Film Corporation argued, among other things,
15. See generally Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and
Press in State Courts Prior to Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 14
(Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds., Longman, Inc. 1982).
16. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)
(dicta refutes free-expression challenge to injunction of labor boycott); Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (holding that illegal aliens lack free speech
rights); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (dicta interprets First
Amendment and other Bill of Rights provisions narrowly).
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that this licensing requirement amounted to a prior restraint contravening
the U.S. and state constitutions. 17  The Court rejected this claim,
reasoning "that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit."' 8 As such, the censorship
statute constituted a reasonable regulation on personal liberty-that is,
economic liberty-because it was "in the interest of the public morals
and welfare."1 9 While many films might be "useful and entertaining,"
some might be used for "evil," insidiously corrupting adults and
children.2°
Even when the justices acknowledged a free-expression
question, they tended to treat the issue as an aspect of due-process
liberty. In Halter v. Nebraska,21 the Court upheld the conviction under a
state flag-desecration statute of defendants who sold bottled beer affixed
with labels bearing the flag. As noted in Justice John Marshall Harlan's
majority opinion, over one dissenter, many states had similar statutes
22
protective of the flag. Harlan discussed free expression at length but as
an aspect of due-process liberty rather than as a First Amendment right
per se. He began by explicating the powers of a republican democratic
government: "a state possesses all legislative power consistent with a
republican form of government; therefore each state . . . may, by
legislation, provide not only for the health, morals, and safety of its
people, but for the common good, as involved in the well-being, peace,
happiness and prosperity of the people. 23 Thus, as Harlan explained,
"[i]t is familiar law that even the privileges of citizenship and the rights
inhering in personal liberty are subject, in their enjoyment, to such
reasonable restraints as may be required for the general good.",2 4 More
17. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 231
(1915).
18. Id. at 244.
19. Id. at 242.
20. Id.; see also Graber, supra note 5, at 34-36 (discussing judicial acceptance
of position that liberty encompassed free expression); RABBAN, FORGOTTEN, supra
note 5, at 173-75 (discussing Supreme Court cases where justices effectively ignored
Free Speech issues); White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 405-06 (explaining how
Court subsumed free-expression issues within economic liberty).
21. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
22. Id. at 39-40.
23. Id. at 40-41.
24. Id. at 42 (alteration added).
[Vol. 6
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specifically, then, free expression, as an aspect of personal liberty, was
subordinate to any state actions promoting the community's welfare. In
this particular case, the protection of the flag from desecration, including
its use "for purposes of trade and traffic," would further the common
25good. Indeed, Harlan concluded that a state would "be wanting in care
for the well-being of its people if it ignores the fact that they regard the
flag as a symbol of their country's power and prestige, and will be
impatient if any open disrespect is shown towards it.
' 26
Another 1907 decision, Patterson v. Colorado,27 warrants special
attention because Holmes wrote the majority opinion, his first in a free-
expression case at the Supreme Court. Patterson involved a contempt of
court arising from the publication of a cartoon and articles that allegedly
could embarrass the Colorado Supreme Court and interfere with its
"impartial administration of justice" in pending cases.2' Holmes
assumed, without deciding, that the Fourteenth Amendment proscribed
state governments from infringing free expression. While unclear,
Holmes seemed to discuss free expression as an aspect of liberty, as had
the Halter Court, rather than suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment
29applied or incorporated the First Amendment per se against the states.
At the same time, Holmes seemed to equate Fourteenth Amendment free
speech liberty with First Amendment free expression. Either way, then,
Holmes interpreted free expression, whether primarily a Fourteenth- or
First Amendment liberty, harmoniously with the Halter Court's
understanding. Holmes wrote that "the main purpose of such
constitutional provisions [protecting free speech and a free press] is 'to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
28. Id. at 458-59.
29. In other words, Holmes did not treat the case as raising a First Amendment
issue, which would require him to interpret the First Amendment directly. Rather,
he appeared to treat the case as raising a Fourteenth Amendment issue, which
required him to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. "We leave undecided the
question whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition
similar to that in the First. But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech
and freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the
United States but also of the States, still we should be far from the conclusion that
the plaintiff in error would have us reach." Id. at 462.
199
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practiced by other governments."' 30  Yet, consistent with republican
democratic principles, constitutional protections of free expression "do
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare." 31 Thus, while the proscription of prior
restraints protects even false statements, the government's power to
impose criminal punishment on expression to further the common good
extends "as well to the true as to the false. 32  In short, Holmes's
understanding of free expression corresponded with the standard
nineteenth and early twentieth-century renditions of the legal doctrine.
Prior restraints were prohibited, but the government could punish speech
with bad tendencies because doing so would promote the common
good--even if the expression asserted the truth.33
Holmes wrote his second free-expression opinion in Fox v.
Washington,34 decided in 1915. The state convicted Jay Fox for
publishing an article, The Nude and the Prudes, which violated a
criminal libel statute proscribing expression that tended "to encourage or
advocate disrespect for law. ,35 Holmes's unanimous opinion discussed
free expression but, as in Patterson, Holmes never clarified whether he
was focused on the First Amendment per se or on Fourteenth
36
Amendment liberty. Regardless, Holmes partially sidestepped the
constitutional challenges by interpreting the statute consistently with the
bad-tendency standard. That is, by construing the statute harmoniously
with constitutional standards, as Holmes understood them at the time,
Holmes obviated any need to discuss further whether the statute as
applied violated free expression protections.37
30. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313-14 (Mass. 1825)
(alteration added) (italics in original)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 399 (explaining that the "precise
constitutional basis" of the Patterson appeal was "unclear").
34. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
35. Id. at 275.
36. See RABBAN, FORGOTrEN, supra note 5, at 139-40 (describing how Gilbert
Roe framed his arguments to the Court as focusing on the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the first amendment).
37. 236 U.S. at 277; see also White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 402
(emphasizing that in Fox Holmes broadly interpreted the concept of a bad tendency).
2008] INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HOLMES 201
II. WORLD WAR I AND SUPPRESSION
On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to. ,,38
declare war on Germany to make "[t]he world... safe for democracy.
Four days later, Congress issued its declaration of war. Wilson
immediately sought congressional action to suppress opposition to the
war. In his own words, "censorship . . . is absolutely necessary to the
public safety. ' 39 "[I]n every country there are some persons in a position
to do mischief ... and whose interests or desires ... [would be] highly
dangerous to the Nation in the midst of a war.",40 From the Department
of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren drafted a bill "for
suppressing or punishing disloyal and hostile acts and utterances.'
Before long, Congress opened debate on this espionage bill. While some
proposed provisions generated extensive congressional discussions, Title
I, Section III, provoked little, even though the government would indict
the "overwhelming majority" of Espionage Act defendants under this
42section. Section III allowed the government to punish anyone
obstructing the draft ("the recruiting or enlistment service of the United
States") or causing or attempting to cause insubordination or disloyalty
43within the military. On May 16, 1918, less than a year after the
enactment of the original Espionage Act, Congress overwhelmingly
passed an amended Section III, which came to be called the Sedition Act
of 1918. With this legislative proscription of "any disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive" expression concerning the nation's government,
38. Wilson's Speech for Declaration of War Against Germany (April 2, 1917),
reprinted in 2 Commager, supra note 5, at 128, 131 (alteration added).
39. 55 CONG. REc. 3144 (May 31, 1917) (quoting letter from Wilson to
Representative Edwin Y. Webb, May 22, 1917).
40. Id. (alterations added); see also Blanchard, supra note 5, at 76 (explaining
how Wilson, when he asked for a declaration of war, already was worried about
spies); Murphy, supra note 5, at 52-58 (discussing Wilson's desire for suppression).
41. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1217-18 (quoting 1918 ATT'Y GEN.
ANN. REP. 41).
42. Id. at 1223-24; see, e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 1823-34 (May 4, 1917).
43. David Rabban and Christina Wells agree that a congressional majority
believed the original Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 40 Stat. 217, authorized
the restriction of expression, while Geoffrey Stone argues otherwise. Rabban,
Emergence, supra note 5, at 1218-27; Stone, Espionage, supra note 5, 345-55;
Wells, supra note 5, at 1582.
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Constitution, military, or flag, Congress erased any lingering doubts
regarding its willingness to foster suppression.44
Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory epitomized the Wilson
administration's attitude toward draft- and war-protesters when he
warned: "May God have mercy on them, for they need expect none from
an outraged people and an avenging government., 45  The Justice
Department initiated more than 2,000 prosecutions and secured
convictions in more than 1,000 cases under the Espionage and Sedition
46
Acts. In most of these cases, the judges interpreted the statutory
language broadly and allowed juries to determine guilt. The courts
usually did not consider the constitutionality of the convictions under the
First Amendment. 47  Sentences could be severe, with twenty-four
individuals receiving twenty-year prison terms, six receiving fifteen-year
terms, and eleven receiving ten-year terms.48 Individuals were convicted
for arguing that the government should fund the war effort through
heavier taxation rather than with bonds, that conscription violated the
Constitution, that Christian teachings proscribed fighting in a war, and
44. An Act to Amend Section Three, Title One of the Espionage Act (May 16,
1918), 40 Stat. 553 (the Sedition Act). The House approved the bill 293 to one,
while the Senate approved it forty-eight to twenty-six, with twenty-four of the nays
coming from Republicans. 56 CONG. REc. 6057 (May 4, 1918) (Senate vote); id. at
6186-87 (May 7, 1918) (House vote); POLENBERG, supra note 5, at 33 (legislative
history).
45. Stone, Origins, supra note 5, at 413 (quoting N.Y. TIMES 3 (Nov. 21,
1917)).
46. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 387-94 (Harcourt, Brace &
Howe 1920) (Index of Reported Cases Under the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918)
[hereinafter CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH]. Chafee's other key writings on free
expression during World War I include the following: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., A
Contemporary State Trial-The United States Versus Jacob Abrams Et Al., 33
HARV. L. REV. 747 (1920) [hereinafter Chafee, Abrams]; Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1918, at 66 [hereinafter Chafee, Free
Speech]; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV.
932 (1919) [hereinafter Chafee, War Time]; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Legislation
Against Anarchy, NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 1919, at 379 [hereinafter Chafee,
Legislation].
47. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1234-35. For a typical case, see
Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919).
48. Washburn, supra note 5, at 13; Wells, supra note 5, at 1582-83 (listing
indictments).
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that the war was being fought for profiteers.49 One person was sentenced
to eighteen months in prison for mailing a chain letter that requested
"immediate peace." Another person was sentenced to ten years for
producing a movie about the Revolutionary War that depicted British
51soldiers killing Americans. Yet another person was sentenced to
twenty years because, arguing that the war benefited capitalists, he
prodded Iowans not to reelect a congressman who supported
52conscription.
Fueled by nativism and xenophobia, public opinion strongly
supported governmental suppression. The Head of the War Emergency
Division of the Department of Justice, John Lord O'Brian, later admitted
that "immense pressure" had been "brought to bear" during the war for
"wholesale repression and restraint of public opinion. 53  Suppression
manifested a sustained drive toward conformity with mainstream views,
values, and interests. 4 Any Wobbly (a member of the radical labor
union, the Industrial Workers of the World, or the IWW), Socialist,
pacifist, or other outsider who criticized the administration or its war-
related policies was open to prosecution and conviction. The Socialist
party, for instance, had several hundred thousand members in 1916, and
grew even stronger in 1917, precisely because it was the only political
party to oppose entry into the war. But during the war, the government
used the Espionage Act to deny mail service to Socialist publications and
to prosecute most of the party's antiwar leaders." Meanwhile, the
government arrested, indicted, and convicted hundreds upon hundreds of
Wobblies. In a single trial in Chicago, 101 IWW leaders were
prosecuted and convicted; the jury returned more than 400 guilty verdicts
49. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 57-59, 61-62.
50. Id. at 60.
51. Id. at 60-61.
52. Id. at 62-63.
53. Stone, Espionage, supra note 5, at 337; see also MURPHY, supra note 5, at
16 (quoting O'Brien, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N 275,
305 (1919)); STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 5, at 212-20 (discussing the
ambivalences of O'Brian and Alfred Bettman in the Justice Department).
54. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 219-20, 247-49 (1992 ed.); Murphy, supra note 5, at 271.
55. Murphy, supra note 5, at 141-43; HOwARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 355-59 (Harper & Row 1980). In the 1912 presidential election,
the Socialist candidate, Eugene Debs, received 900,000 votes. Id. at 333.
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in less than an hour. The presiding judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
brushed aside any potential free-expression issues: "When the country is
at peace it is the legal right of free speech to oppose going to war and to
oppose even preparation for war. But when once war [sic] is declared
this right ceases."' 56 By the end of the war, the IWW was ravaged, with
nearly all executive-board members in prison.57
While support for suppression was widespread, there were
opponents, both official and unofficial. A handful of lower court judges
attempted to protect expression by interpreting the Espionage Act
narrowly. Barely a month after Congress passed the 1917 Act, Judge
Learned Hand of the Southern District of New York decided Masses
Publishing Company v. Patten. 8  Masses Publishing had sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the postmaster from refusing the
revolutionary journal, The Masses, access to the mails. In granting the
injunction, Hand explicitly stated that the case neither raised the issue of
congressional power to restrict the mails during wartime nor the issue of
freedom of the press. 59 Rather, to Hand, the question was solely a matter
of statutory construction and application. Did Congress intend to
proscribe the mailing of publications, like The Masses, that criticized the
war and the draft? Despite so limiting the case, Hand implicitly
discussed the constitutional parameters of a free press by interpreting the
relevant sections of the Act, Section III and a nonmailability provision,
in accordance with his understanding of protected expression. 60 Most
importantly, Hand suggested that a bad-tendency standard did not
sufficiently protect freedom. The postmaster, therefore, was not
authorized to deny Masses Publishing access to the mails merely because
the "general tenor and animus of the paper as a whole were subversive to
authority and seditious in effect.",6 1 Instead, Hand suggested that an
overt-acts or direct-incitement test embodied the appropriate standard-
56. Blanchard, supra note 5, at 88 (quoting Judge Landis).
57. Id. at 87-88; PAUL LE BLANC, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE U.S. WORKING
CLASS: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 69 (Humanity
Books 1999); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL
SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933, at 118-41 (Univ. Ill 1994).
58. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), reversed, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id. at 38-39.
61. Id. at 542-43.
2008] INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HOLMES
and hence the one that Congress must be assumed to have followed
unless expressly stating otherwise. According to Hand, "[i]f one stops
short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist
the law, .. .one should not be held to have attempted to cause its
violation." 62 Political agitation, which The Masses aimed to foment, did
not equate with "direct incitement to violent resistance. 63 In short, as
interpreted by Hand, the Espionage Act proscribed only direct advocacy
or incitement of an overt act of unlawful conduct. Regardless, the
Second Circuit overruled Hand's decision and repudiated his infusion of
the Espionage Act with a direct-incitement standard. Instead, like most
other courts, the Second Circuit interpreted the Act in accordance with
the bad-tendency approach. 64
At the outset of the war, many Progressive intellectuals,
including John Dewey and the editors of the New Republic, supported
65
suppression of dissenters. They believed the national government
reasonably pursued the common good by punishing expression that
might weaken the war effort. After witnessing the degree of wartime
suppression, however, some of these intellectuals withdrew their support.
The New Republic editors, for example, invited a young Harvard law
professor, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to write an article advocating for the
protection of speech and writing. In Freedom of Speech, published in the
November 16, 1918, issue, Chafee inquired: "Where shall we draw the
line [between punishable offenses and constitutionally protected speech
and writing]?' ' 66 Writing in the shadow of the numerous Espionage Act
62. Id. at 540 (alteration added).
63. Id; see also RABBAN, FORGOTTEN, supra note 5, at 261-65 (discussing
Masses).
64. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). For another
atypical lower court decision, see United States v. Hall, 248 F. 150 (D. Mont. 1918).
65. Editors, Public Opinion in War Time, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 22, 1917, at
204; John Dewey, The Future of Pacificism, NEW REPUBLIC, July 28, 1917, at 358.
66. Chafee, Free Speech, supra note 46, at 67 (alteration added). For an
explanation of how Chafee was asked to write this essay, see DONALD L. SMITH,
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 16-17 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1986); Rabban, Progressive, supra note 5, at 1017-18; Ragan, supra note 7, at
37. For other helpful sources on Chafee and the emergence of a civil libertarian
movement, see DONALD JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS:
WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Univ. Ky.
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convictions, Chafee articulated a philosophical foundation that he
thought justified an expansive concept of free expression under the First
Amendment. "The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this.
One of the most important purposes of society and government is the
discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is
possible only through absolutely unlimited discussion .... ,,67 Thus,
Chafee reiterated John Milton's rationale for broadly protecting speech
and writing: the free and open exchange of ideas helps society arrive at
truth. Chafee acknowledged, though, that the recognition of the social
interest in the search for truth did not, by itself, determinatively resolve
free-expression issues. "[T]here are other purposes of government, such
as order, the training of the young, protection against external
aggression. Unlimited discussion sometimes interferes with these
purposes, which must then be balanced against freedom of speech, but
freedom of speech ought to weigh very heavily in the scale." 68 In other
words, the social interest in free expression-the search for truth-must
sometimes be balanced against other social interests, such as safety and
order. But in this balance, courts should give special weight to free
expression. "The First Amendment gives binding force to this principle
of political wisdom," Chafee insisted. 69 He concluded by quoting from
Hand's Masses opinion and by articulating a direct-incitement or overt-
acts test. "In war-time, therefore, speech should be free, unless it is
clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference with the conduct
of the war."
7 0
Press 1963); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF
THE ACLU (Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
67. Chafee, Free Speech, supra note 46, at 67.
68. Id. (alteration added).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 67-68; see also John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty
of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England, 55 CONG. REc. 1825-34 (May
4, 1917); John Dewey, In Explanation of Our Lapse, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1917,
at 17 (admitting that wartime suppression was wrong). In some ways, Chafee's
essay resembled an essay by Herbert L. Stewart, published in The Nation more than
a year earlier. Like Stewart, Chafee formulated a Miltonian argument to suggest that
free expression served a social interest or value because it could lead to an open
exchange of ideas and the pursuit of truth. Moreover, both Chafee and Stewart
believed that this social value of free expression must be balanced against other
social interests or values. Yet, Chafee and Stewart ultimately reached different
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III. THE FIRST ESPIONAGE ACT CASES
The first four Espionage Act cases to reach the Supreme Court
were not argued until January 1919, after hostilities had ended. The first
two were Schenck v. United States7 ' and Sugarman v. United States.
72 In
Schenck, Charles T. Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were indicted under
both Section III and the nonmailability provision of the 1917 Espionage
Act. Schenck was the general secretary of the Socialist party, while Baer
served on its Executive Board. They printed fifteen- to sixteen-thousand
copies of a leaflet that they mailed to men eligible for the draft. The
leaflet advocated for the repeal of the draft law and argued that
conscription violated the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription of
slavery. "If you do not assert and support your rights," the leaflet added,
"you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty
of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain. 73 Given the
nativist anti-radicalism rampant at the time, a jury predictably convicted
both defendants.
Holmes wrote a unanimous opinion upholding the convictions.
When he addressed the defendants' argument that the First Amendment
protected their expression (the leaflet), Holmes's opinion turned obscure.
"It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of
speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them
may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v.
Colorado." 74  Did Holmes mean that First Amendment protections
extended beyond the common law proscription of prior restraints?
Holmes, of course, had written the majority opinion in Patterson. In that
ambiguous case, he had seemingly discussed free expression as an aspect
conclusions: Stewart argued for the restriction of expression during wartime, while
Chafee argued for broad protections. Their disagreement lay largely in the weight
they accorded to free expression in the balance against other national interests during
wartime. Unlike Stewart, Chafee argued that the First Amendment mandated that
free expression be given an especially heavy weight. Herbert L. Stewart, Freedom
of Speech in War Time, 105 THE NATION, Aug. 30, 1917, at 219.
71. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
72. 249 U.S. 182 (1919).
73. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49-5 1.
74. Id. at 51-52. Holmes's puzzling phrases in his free-expression cases are
not atypical. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 412.
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of Fourteenth Amendment liberty, though he had also connoted that
Fourteenth Amendment free-expression-liberty equated with First
Amendment free expression. Holmes's Schenck opinion, consequently,
might clarify Patterson, given that Schenck explicitly addressed free
expression as a First Amendment issue. Schenck suggests that Holmes's
discussion of free expression in Patterson should be understood as an
exegesis on the First Amendment per se. But in Patterson, Holmes had
emphasized that the "main purpose" of the constitutional protection of
expression was to proscribe prior restraints and that the government was
otherwise empowered to punish expression. 75 Thus, in Schenck, Holmes
probably intended to reiterate his Patterson position, though he did so
with inverted language. He wrote that the First Amendment did more
than proscribe prior restraints, though that proscription was the First
Amendment's "main purpose., 76 What, then, did the First Amendment
proscribe beyond prior restraints? Patterson had already answered that
question. The First Amendment imposed in the realm of expression
(speech and writing) the standard republican democratic restriction that
governmental actions promote the common good; only expression with
bad tendencies could therefore be punished. Hence, Holmes in Schenck
proffered, in his view, a prototypical example of unprotected expression:
"The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 77 Why so?
Because shouting fire in a crowded theater would likely cause harm to
other people; the expression would have bad tendencies.
Continuing in the same paragraph, Holmes articulated a doctrinal
standard delineating the scope of free expression under the First
Amendment. "The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent., 78 Apparently, in light of Holmes's
invocation of Patterson, followed by his example of falsely shouting fire,
Holmes did not intend this "clear and present danger" language to
delineate a new standard for free expression. Rather, he meant merely to
75. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
76. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51-52.
77. Id. at 52.
78. Id.
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reiterate the customary bad-tendency test, adhered to by the Court in the
past and by most other courts for over 100 years. If so, one might still
wonder why Holmes did not state the bad-tendency doctrine in its more
typical language? Most likely, Holmes drew on his understanding of the
law of criminal attempts to inform his construal of bad tendency. In
Schenck, immediately after Holmes articulated the clear and present
danger test, he clarified its application in the particular circumstances of
wartime.
It is a question of proximity and degree. When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.79
In any particular case, he seemed to say, the discernment of a
clear and present danger-or a bad tendency--depended on the
circumstances, as guided by legal concepts central to criminal attempts,
proximity and degree. When discussing criminal attempts in his book,
The Common Law, Holmes wrote: "Acts should be judged by their
tendency under the known circumstances, not by the actual intent which
accompanies them." As was his wont, Holmes emphasized his
preference for a supposedly objective standard, one that did not turn in
its application on the subjective motivations or desires of the actor.
"[A]n act is punishable as an attempt, if, supposing it to have produced
its natural and probable effect, it would have amounted to a substantive
crime.",8 1 Indeed, Holmes explained that, in a close or difficult case, a
judge should consider "the nearness of the danger, the greatness of the
harm, and the degree of apprehension felt.",82 From this passage in The
Common Law, Holmes might well have derived his reiteration of the
79. Id. When Holmes sat on the highest Massachusetts court, he decided a
criminal attempts case where the defendant, after preparing a building for arson,
solicited another person to start the fire. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55
(Mass. 1901); see Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1274-75, 1277-78
(discussing Peaslee).
80. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 66 (Dover ed.,
Publisher 1991) (1881).
81. Id. (alteration added).
82. Id. at 68.
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bad-tendency standard as a clear and present danger test. Indeed, years
later, Holmes was asked by letter about the source of his clear and
present danger language. Holmes's "hurried answer" did not clearly
respond, but he nonetheless noted: "I did think hard on the matter of
attempts in my Common Law and [in a couple of cases]. ' 3
The same day the Court decided Schenck, March 3, 1919, it also
84handed down the decision in Sugarman v. United States. Justice Louis
D. Brandeis, this time, wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court.
83. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12,
1922), responding to Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr. to Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. (June 9, 1922), both quoted in Bogen, supra note 7, at 99-100 (alterations added);
see Ragan, supra note 7, at 34-36 (stressing Holmes's reliance on common law
concept of criminal attempts in free speech context); White, Justice Holmes, supra
note 5, at 414-15, 418-19 (discussing Holmes's understanding of criminal attempts
and how it shaped his clear and present danger test). Compare GRABER, supra note
5, at 110 (asserting strongly that Holmes derived clear and present danger language
from The Common Law), with Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1271-73, 1276-
78 (arguing that this connection was probable but not definite). Stone contends that
the Department of Justice, in its briefs to the Supreme Court, maintained that the
government needed to prove specific intent and bad tendency "as separate and
distinct requirements" under the 1917 Espionage Act, and that Holmes likewise did
not adopt an "extreme version of the bad tendency/constructive intent standard."
Stone, Origins, supra note 5, at 446-47. To me, the briefs do not adequately support
Stone's contention. For instance, Stone quotes from a brief to demonstrate that
Justice attorneys "insisted that in order to convict under section 3 the government
had to prove both that the defendant had a 'specific, willful, criminal intent' and that
he used language having 'a natural and reasonably probable tendency to cause the
results which have been forbidden by these provisions of the espionage law."' Id. at
445. Yet, these passages in the brief actually were derived from a long quotation of
the trial judge's jury instructions. Brief for the United States at 75-77, Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
5, at 601, 680-82. The Justice Department attorneys repeated the trial judge's charge
so they could argue that it was adequate. Moreover, in these briefs, the Justice
Department attorneys always argued, naturally enough, that the evidence was
sufficient to support the convictions; they did not argue that the evidence was
insufficient to prove specific intent. See e.g., id. at 77-79, reprinted in 19
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 682-84; Brief for the United States, at 23-31,
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), reprinted in 18 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 5, at 1021, 1048-56. Finally, Stone's interpretation of Holmes seems to
disregard Holmes's explicit preference for, in his writings on criminal attempts, an
objective standard revolving around the natural consequences of a defendant's
actions.
84. 249 U.S. 182 (1919).
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Abraham L. Sugarman had been convicted for violating the 1917
Espionage Act, Section III, for his speech at a Socialist meeting attended
85
by many draft registrants. Sugarman had condemned the war as a
"capitalist conspiracy."'86 His appeal to the Court arose from the trial
judge's refusal to give, in the precise words requested, two jury
instructions related to the First Amendment and free expression. The
first requested jury instruction accentuated that First Amendment
protections remain in force during wartime. The second was a precise
and straightforward statement of the bad tendency standard. The judge
combined these two requests into one jury charge, and in so doing,
actually articulated a standard more favorable to the defendant than bad
tendency.87 The judge instructed the jury, in part, as follows: "A man
has a right to honestly discuss a measure or a law, and to honestly
criticize it. But no man may advise another to disobey the law, or to
obstruct its execution, without making himself liable to be called to
account therefor." 88  This charge to the jury nearly required direct
incitement of unlawful conduct. Regardless, the Court found this
instruction permissible. In his brief opinion, Brandeis reasoned that the
judge's "charge clearly embodied the substance of the two requests made
by the defendant., 89 Thus, Brandeis either did not acknowledge or did
not recognize the difference between the bad-tendency test and the
judge's charge.90 Sugarman, meanwhile, had bypassed the Circuit Court
of Appeals and had instead invoked a jurisdictional statute that allowed a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court for constitutional claims. Therefore,
the Court, having concluded that the jury instruction did not raise a
"substantial constitutional question," dismissed the case "for want of
jurisdiction." 91
85. Id. at 183.
86. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 413 n.123.
87. While this charge was favorable to the defendant, he nonetheless appealed
because he was convicted. Sugarman, 249 U.S. at 185.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. At this stage, then, Brandeis had not yet fully developed his ideas
regarding free expression.
91. Sugarman, 249 U.S. at 185.
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One week later, March 10, 1919, the Court handed down
decisions in Frohwerk v. United States
92 and Debs v. United States,
93
both with unanimous opinions written by Holmes. Jacob Frohwerk, a
copy editor for a German-language newspaper, was convicted and
sentenced to ten years imprisonment under the Espionage Act, Section
II, based on his participation in publishing several articles. As described
in the Department of Justice brief,
[t]he main tenor of the whole series of articles is
that Germany committed no wrong against the
United States; that this country entered into the war
for the benefit of England and the rich men; that
the official reasons for our entrance into the war,
such as the benefit of democracy and wrongs
committed against us by Germany, are mere
pretenses.
94
Yet, as Holmes acknowledged, "[i]t does not appear that there was any
special effort to reach men who were subject to the draft., 95 In this
regard, then, the case factually diverged from Schenck, where the leaflet
was mailed to draft-eligible men. Nonetheless, in upholding Frohwerk's
conviction, Holmes reasoned that Schenck controlled. "[W]e think it
necessary to add to what has been said in Schenck v. United States, only
that the First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free
speech as such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to
give immunity for every possible use of language." 96 In other words, the
First Amendment did not provide absolute protection for speech and
writing; not a novel proposition, of course, after Schenck and the
previous Supreme Court cases. Thus, even though no evidence in the
record showed that the newspaper had influenced anybody to oppose the
92. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
93. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
94. Brief for the United States at 3, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919), reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 467, 472 (alteration
added).
95. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 208 (alteration added).
96. Id. at 206 (emphasis added) (alteration added). The Court added that "so
far as the language of the article goes there is not much to choose between
expressions to be found in them and those before us in Schenck v. United States."
Id. at 207.
[Vol. 6
2008] INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HOLMES
war, Holmes concluded: "it is impossible to say that it might not have
been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little
breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact was known
and relied upon by those who sent the paper out." 97 Holmes's use of this
language-"a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame"-strongly
reinforced the conclusion that he had not intended his "clear and present
danger" phrase in Schenck to articulate a new and more protective
standard for free expression. To the contrary, Holmes's subsequent
Frohwerk language not only disregarded his "clear and present danger"
phrasing, but it also resonated closely with the bad-tendency test. Given
the facts of the case and the Court's ready willingness to find the
writings unprotected, the "kindle a flame" language appeared to be just
another way to say bad tendency.
98
The Court's first decision under the amended Espionage Act (the
1918 Sedition Act) was Debs v. United States.99 Eugene Debs, national
97. Id. at 209.
98. RABBAN, FORGOTTEN, supra note 5, at 282-83; White, Justice Holmes,
supra note 5, at 416-19.
99. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). One remarkable oddity related to Debs is the
scholarly assumption that Debs was indicted under the 1917 Espionage Act. See
e.g., ERWIN CHEMER1NSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPAL AND POLICIES 957 (2d
ed. 2002) (categorizing Debs as a conviction under the 1917 Act); Laycock, supra
note 7, at 168 (the subsequently decided Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919), differed from earlier decisions, including Debs, because it was under the
1918 amendments); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2353, 2357 n.12 (2000) ("In Debs, the
Court unanimously sustained the conviction of prominent socialist politician Eugene
Debs for violating the Espionage Act of 1917"). In truth, Debs was indicted under
the amended Act (that is, under the 1918 Sedition Act). Debs, 249 U.S. at 212. The
brief for Debs expressly stated that all counts of the indictment were "under Section
3, Title I, of an Act of Constitution of June 15, 1917, as amended by Act of May 16,
1918." Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error, at 1, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919),
reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 511, 514. The brief for the
United States described the indictment in similar terms, then added in a footnote "the
full text" of the amended Espionage Act, Section Three (the 1918 Sedition Act).
Brief for the United States, at 12 & n.1, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919),
reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 601, 617 & n.1. One possible
explanation for the scholarly confusion is that Gilbert Roe's amicus brief actually
focused on the original 1917 Espionage Act rather than on the amended version.
Brief of Gilbert E. Roe, as amicus curiae, at 3-22, 50-51, Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919), reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 697, 704-23,
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leader of the Socialist party, was convicted because of the content of a
public speech given at a party convention.100 His eloquent statement to
the district court judge apparently did not help Debs's cause. Just before
sentencing, Debs declared that "while there is a lower class, I am in it;
and while there is a criminal element, I am of it; and while there is a soul
in prison, I am not free." 101  The judge sentenced Debs to ten years
imprisonment. As described by the Supreme Court, Debs's earlier
speech at the party convention had been mostly about Socialism, though
he had also confided to the audience "that he had to be prudent and might
not be able to say all that he thought, thus intimating to his hearers that
,,102
they might infer that he meant more ... He had glorified minorities,
according to the Court, and predicted "the success of the international
Socialist crusade, with the interjection that 'you need to know that you
are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.'
10 3
Holmes's opinion, affirming the conviction, explicitly approved a jury
instruction that presented the bad-tendency test in conventional terms.
The jurors, as charged, "could not find the defendant guilty for advocacy
of any of his opinions unless the words used had as their natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting
service, &c., and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in
751-52. Why would Roe have focused on the 1917 Act when Debs had been
indicted pursuant to the 1918 amendments? The answer is unclear, but one
possibility is that Roe chose to file an amicus brief raising constitutional challenges
in only one of the first four Supreme Court cases-that one being Debs, of course.
Roe sought to raise constitutional challenges to the Espionage Act, and he apparently
thought that the differences in the indictments among the four cases were not overly
significant. See RABBAN, FORGOTTEN, supra note 5, at 272-79 (discussing the briefs
in Debs). Chafee, too, mistakenly categorized Debs as arising from an indictment
under the 1917 Act. This mischaracterization benefited Chafee's analysis. Given
his desire to expand First Amendment protections, he was able to note briefly that
the 1918 amendments must have been unconstitutional, regardless of what the Court
had previously held. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 969.
100. See Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error, at 2-31, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919), reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at, 515-44 (Debs's
entire speech); Brief for the United States, at 2, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919), reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 601, 607 (describing
context of public speech).
101. WALKER, supra note 66, at 41.
102. Debs, 249 U.S. at 213.
103. Id. at 214.
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his mind."' 0 4 Moreover, Holmes recognized that the jury could find
constructive intent. Evidence that Debs "used words tending to obstruct
the recruiting service" constituted evidence that "he meant that [his
speech] should have that effect."' 1 5 The jury could infer the defendant's
intent to obstruct the draft from the bad tendencies or likely harmful
effects of his words. Any further potential First Amendment issues,
Holmes noted, had been "disposed of in Schenck v. United States".' 
06
At this stage, after the Supreme Court's first four Espionage Act
cases of the World War I era, Holmes had left a distinct impression: he
considered the free-expression claims to be relatively unimportant. Not
thinking the claims too significant, he appeared to write his opinions as
expeditiously as possible, without as much thought or analysis as he
might have accorded to some other cases (though Holmes tended to write
many opinions quickly). To Holmes, the four cases were little more than
"routine" criminal appeals. 10 7  In other contexts, Holmes crafted
analogies that revealed his underlying attitude: free expression did not
merit special protection. In McAuliffe v. New Bedford,108 decided when
Holmes still sat on Massachusetts's highest court, he analogized
"constitutional rights of free speech" to "idleness."'109 In a letter to
Learned Hand, Holmes insisted that "free speech stands no differently
than freedom from vaccination."' 0 Thus, in Schenck, Holmes finished
his discussion of free expression by referring to a recent case that had
upheld convictions under the Selective Draft Law, which instituted
104. Id. at 216.
105. Id. (alteration added).
106. Id. at215.
107. The "evidence strongly suggests that what Professor Kalven said of Debs
was true of all these cases-'It was for Holmes a routine criminal appeal."' Rogat &
O'Fallon, supra note 7, at 1378 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor Ernst Freund
and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 238 (1973)). With regard to
Holmes's propensity for producing opinions quickly, Brandeis said of his colleague:
"Holmes shoots down so quickly and is disturbed if you hold him up." Rabban,
Emergence, supra note 5, at 1330.
108. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
109. Id. at 518.
110. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Learned Hand, June 24, 1918,
reprinted in Gunther, supra note 7, app. at 756-57.
conscription."' "Indeed that case might be said to dispose of the present
contention," Holmes explained, "[b ut as the right to free speech was not
referred to specially, we have thought fit to add a few words.""' 2 This
passage is most telling. The Court, in Schenck, for the first time
explicitly discussed and decided a free-expression claim under the First
Amendment, yet Holmes "thought fit" merely "to add a few words" to a
prior case unrelated to the First Amendment. Certainly, an important
issue would merit more than a few words.
To Holmes, the law of free expression seemed unambiguous.
Less than a week after Frohwerk and Debs were decided, Holmes wrote
to his friend, Harold Laski, a young British political scientist then
teaching at Harvard, that "on the only questions before us I could not
doubt about the law.' '  13 Not entertaining doubts about the legal doctrine,
Holmes cavalierly used or accepted (in jury charges) different phrases to
articulate the ostensibly plain boundary between protected and
punishable expression. No substantial difference existed, it seemed,
between standards that required proof of a clear and present danger
(Schenck), proof that in the circumstances a little breath would kindle a
flame (Frohwerk), or proof that the punished expression would generate
bad tendencies (Debs). If one accounts as well for Brandeis' unanimous
Sugarman opinion, then the justices, including Holmes, also seemed to
disregard any potential differences between a bad tendency and a direct
incitement standard. In fact, Learned Hand, after having read Debs and
Frohwerk, wrote to Holmes to accentuate the differences between his
direct incitement approach from Masses Publishing and Holmes's clear
and present danger test. The defendant's "responsibility," Hand
explained, should only begin "when the words were directly an
incitement.",1 4 To Hand, a direct-incitement test was far more protective
111. Selective Draft Law, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917). Goldman v. United
States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); see Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1244-46
(discussing Selective Draft Law cases).
112. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (alteration added).
113. Letter from Holmes to Laski, March 16, 1919, HOLMES-LASKI, supra
note 7, at 189-190.
114. Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., late March,
1919, reprinted in Appendix, Gunther, supra note 7, at 758.
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of expression than was a clear and present danger test.' 5  Holmes
responded by writing that "I don't quite get your point."" 6 "[Y]ou say
'the responsibility only began when the words were directly an
incitement'- . . . but I don't see how you differ from the test as stated
by me [in Schenck]."' 17 Therefore, Holmes concluded: "So I don't know
what the matter is, or how we differ so far as your letter goes." 18 In
sum, to the Supreme Court Justices, the varieties of phrasing in the
sundry cases were all the same. Despite the different phrasings, Holmes
and the other justices accepted the bad-tendency approach, which they
had, after all, previously followed (recall, Holmes himself had written
two of the prior opinions, in Patterson and Fox). Given that the Court
still operated within a republican democratic regime, with its emphasis
on the common good, this approach was thoroughly predictable.
Moreover, Holmes apparently did not think the amended Act (the 1918
Sedition Act) raised any novel First Amendment issues; otherwise, in
Debs, he would not have invoked Schenek to deflect potential First
Amendment issues.
Baltzer v. United States," 9 an Espionage Act prosecution of
German-American Socialists that reached the Court even before Schenck,
does not suggest any other conclusions. Although the Justices initially
reached a tentative outcome, they ultimately did not decide the case on
its merits. Instead, they reversed and remanded on motion of the
Solicitor General. Of note, while the majority had planned to uphold
the conviction, Holmes prepared a dissent, which Brandeis intended to
join. This unpublished dissent did not explicitly discuss the scope of
protection under the First Amendment, but rather focused on statutory
construction. The defendants had petitioned the Governor of South
115. The Department of Justice attorneys carefully underscored that Hand's
direct incitement test was not a proper statement of legal doctrine. Brief for the
United States, at 71-75, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), reprinted in 19
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 5, at 601, 676-80; Stone, Origins, supra note 5, at
444-45.
116. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Learned Hand, April 3, 1919,
reprinted in Gunther, supra note 7, app. at 759.
117. Id. at 759-60 (alteration added).
118. Id. at 760.
119. Baltzer v. United States, 248 U.S. 593.
120. Id.; see also Novick, supra note 6, at 331-33 (discussing Baltzer).
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Dakota to ask that he change the implementation of the Draft Law.
Holmes emphasized that the petition was "not circulated publicly ' ' 12 1 and
thus could not constitute an obstruction of the draft under the Espionage
Act, § III. To the contrary, the petition was "an appeal for political
action through legal channels.",122  While Holmes believed the case
turned on statutory construction, he nonetheless twice alluded to the
scope of free expression. Both times, however, he appeared to do no
more than express his approval of the bad-tendency test, albeit in a
somewhat convoluted fashion (as was typical for Holmes). First, he
reaffirmed the Court's earlier decisions, which had embraced the bad-
tendency standard. "I agree that freedom of speech is not abridged
unconstitutionally in those cases of subsequent punishment with which
this court has had to deal from time to time."1 23 Second, he wrote: "I
think that our intention to put out all our powers in aid of success in war
should not hurry us into intolerance of opinions and speech that could not
be imagined to do harm. 1 24 At first blush, this language might be
viewed as expressing a disdain for suppression during wartime, but a
closer look reveals an implicit endorsement of the bad-tendency
approach rather than the articulation of a more speech-protective stance.
Expression is unprotected, Holmes seemed to say, if it can "be imagined
to do harm."'125 Indeed, this language might be deemed to be yet another
Holmesian reiteration of the bad tendency standard.
In conclusion, the first set of World War I free-expression cases,
including Baltzer, reveal that Holmes, as well as the other Justices,
viewed free expression as an individual liberty like any other individual
liberty under republican democracy. It was important and should be
protected, but it was also subordinate to any governmental actions
furthering the common good. The government, therefore, could punish
any speech or writing that impeded the national effort during wartime
because such expression would be deemed harmful or with bad
tendencies, and thus would be found to contravene the common good.
The crux of these cases, then, was the Justices' understanding of the
121. Baltzer v. U.S., 248 U.S. 593 (1919), reprinted in Novick, supra note 6,
app. at 388.
122. Id. at 390.
123. Id. at 389-90.
124. Id. at 389.
125. Id. at 389.
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common good, just as in contemporary liberty of contract cases. During
this period, the Court often concluded that asserted governmental
justifications for limiting economic liberties did not constitute the
common good but were instead pretexts for furthering private or partial
interests, such as the interests of laborers.126 At the same time, the Court
consistently found that governmental justifications for limiting free
expression-such as "administering a draft, putting an end to
interferences with the war effort, preventing violence"-fit within
traditional conceptions of the common good. 12 7 Holmes, it should be
added, tended to defer consistently to legislative and executive
determinations of the common good, whether vis-A-vis free expression or
liberty of contract. "I am so skeptical as to our knowledge about the
goodness or badness of laws," Holmes once wrote to Pollock, "that I
have no practical criticism except what the crowd wants."
'' 28
IV. A CIVIL LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENT
The Espionage Act authorized the national government to
prosecute its critics only during wartime. Hostilities ceased on
November 11, 1918, but Congress did not ratify a peace treaty until
1921.1 29  Thus, the government's power under the Act remained
ambiguous, and whether authorized or not, the government continued to
arrest and harass Socialists, union activists, and the like. A brief wartime
golden era for moderate labor unions, like the American Federation of
126. See e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 591 (1917) (invalidating state
law that proscribed employment agents from charging workers "for furnishing [the
worker) with employment or with information leading thereto" (alteration added));
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state law proscribing yellow dog
contracts); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state law limiting
hours for bakery employees).
127. Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of
State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q.
623, 640 (1994).
128. Letter from Holmes to Pollock, April 23, 1910, in I HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 163 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1941);
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
129. Treaty of Peace between the United States and Germany, 42 Stat. 1939
(1921).
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Labor, ended abruptly, and the nation immediately succumbed to a wave
of violent strikes. In 1919, the cost-of-living index shot upward-by
1920, it was nearly twice the 1916 average-forcing workers to press for
higher wages. 13 Starting in early 1919, nationwide strikes disrupted the
steel and coal industries. Seattle was hit by a shipyard workers' strike
that spread into a general strike, which immobilized the city for five
days. The Boston police went on strike, and looting broke out. Racial
tensions led to riots in several cities, including Chicago and Omaha,
where federal troops were summoned to restore order. On May 1, 1919,
newspapers reported an assassination plot aimed against several cabinet
members, plus Justice Holmes, John D. Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan.
On June 2, 1919, a bomb exploded at the Washington home of A.
Mitchell Palmer, who had become Attorney General three months
earlier. When the Communist Third International formed, "to encourage
worldwide proletarian revolutions," American fears intensified that
Bolshevism was spreading and underlay the societal disruptions.13 1 With
nativism and xenophobia flaring up, the first Red Scare burst into a-• 132
conflagration. The American Legion emerged to push forward a 100-
percent-Americanism movement; with the war over, a need for unity no
longer tempered the drive to conformity. The Ku Klux Klan resurrected
itself and flourished. During the war, five states had passed laws
proscribing criminal syndicalism; fourteen more states followed suit in
1919. Then, in the summer of 1919, Palmer, with J. Edgar Hoover's
assistance, started a campaign to rid the nation of radicals. Russian
immigrants, labor leaders, Jews, blacks, and other outsiders, considered
inherently suspect, were deported or prosecuted. Universities such as
Harvard and Columbia restricted the admission of Jews, while in 1919,
Henry Ford explained that "[i]nternational Jewish bankers arrange [wars]
so they can make money out of them."' 33 The black press had existed for
decades, but now, in response to growing urban audiences, it
increasingly reported the details of racial discrimination. The
130. THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 127 (1965) (Table: Cost-of-Living Indexes).
131. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1313.
132. For discussions of the Red Scare, see HIGHAM, supra note 54, at 222-32,
277-78, 286-99; LEUCHTENBURG, supra, note 5, at 66-88; WASHBURN, supra note 5,
at 14-23.
133. HIGHAM, supra note 54, at 284 (quoting Ford) (alteration added).
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government reacted by targeting black writers and editors for
investigations as Bolshevik revolutionaries. 3 4 As early as February 8,
1919, The Nation recognized that that the wartime suppression of civil
liberties would not soon end. "The process of turning the thoughtful
working people of the country into dangerous radicals and extreme direct
actionists goes merrily on."' 35  Even though wartime apologists for
suppression had refused to admit as much, "[it] required no prophet...
to foretell that the hatred and intolerance born of war would in due time•,.. ,136
be turned against unpopular minorities.
This burst of postwar suppression ignited indignation among
some Americans. In particular, the aftermath of the war had left pro-war
Progressives sorely disappointed in two interrelated ways. First,
Progressives believed the United States had fought the war to make the
world "safe for democracy."'1 37 But when Congress swung Republican in
the 1918 elections, Wilson's political strength ebbed. On November 19,
1919, after a summer-long national debate, Congress defeated the
proposed Versailles Treaty and, with it, Wilson's Covenant for a League
of Nations. Many Progressives were forced to wonder why America had
gone to war in the first place.138 Second, before the war, Progressives
had believed centralized governmental power was needed to combat the
economic inequities inherent to an industrialized society. The exercise
of governmental power, in other words, would further the common good.
Consequently, early in the war, most Progressives believed suppression
of draft and war protesters would benefit the common good, but as the
war progressed, some Progressives renounced suppression (leading, for
instance, to Chafee's New Republic essay). 139 Then, as suppression of
134. WASHBURN, supra note 5, at 14-23.
135. Editorial, Danger Ahead, 108 THE NATION 186, 186 (1919).
136. Id.; see Frederic Almy, The Land of the Free, 108 THE NATION, 345, 352
(1919) (arguing for free expression) (alteration added).
137. President Wilson, Speech for Declaration of War Against Germany (April
2, 1917), reprinted in 2 COMMAGER, supra note 5, at 128, 131.
138. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 5, at 50-65; Rabban, Emergence, supra note
5, at 1216, 1313. The Treaty was reconsidered and again defeated in subsequent
votes. The Defeat of the League of Nations, reprinted in 2 COMMAGER, supra note
5, at 160.
139. For examples of essays either supporting or indifferent to suppression, see
John Dewey, The Future of Pacificism, NEW REPUBLIC, July 28, 1917, at 358-360;
John Dewey, What America Will Fight For, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 18, 1917, at 68-
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radical outsiders and others continued after the war, even more
Progressives acknowledged the potential dangers of centralized
governmental power. The national government, they saw, did not
necessarily act as an agent for positive social change, for the common
good. Too often, nativist and xenophobic biases as well as partisan
political interests motivated governmental actors. If the nation had gone
to war to spread democracy, was this widespread irrational suppression
of outsiders to be America's gift to the world? To counter these
problems, some of these disheartened Progressives joined those
intellectuals who had earlier opposed suppression during the war to form
an incipient civil libertarian movement. 40 Criticizing Holmes's opinion
in Debs, Ernst Freund argued that since "the war is virtually over," it was
time to hear "the voice of reason." 141 Holmes, however, had taken "the
very essentials of the entire problem for granted."' 142  Holmes's
metaphorical analogy between, on the one hand, political agitation,
including resistance to the war, and on the other hand, shouting fire in a
crowded theater was "manifestly inappropriate.', 143 Free speech became
"a precarious gift" if limited in accordance with the bad-tendency
standard, which allowed "a jury's guessing at motive, tendency and
possible effect."' 144 Chafee, too, wrote again to oppose suppression. He
lamented how both the state and national governments continued to
suppress Socialists and suspected Bolsheviks even though the war had
ended. The nation had grown accustomed to "the pleasure of being able
to silence" radicals and other outsiders.
45
The new cadre of civil libertarians faced a difficult intellectual
and political conundrum. Many of them had for years supported
69; John Dewey, Conscription of Thought, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1917, at
128-130. Dewey changed his position in John Dewey, In Explanation of Our Lapse,
NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1917, at 17-18.
140. GRABER, supra note 5, at 87-121; Rabban, Progressive, supra note 5, at
954-56; e.g., Randolph S. Bourne, Twilight of Idols, SEVEN ARTS, Oct. 1917,
reprinted in THE RADICAL WILL 336 (1977).
141. Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 3, 1919, at 13, 15.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Legislation Against Anarchy, NEW REPUBLIC, July
23, 1919, at 379, 384.
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Progressive legislation that opponents claimed violated economic
liberties. Courts ought to defer to the legislatures, the new libertarians
had previously argued. For the most part, these civil libertarians retained
these views of economic regulations; though they now questioned
legislative actions that, from their vantage, violated the liberties of
speech and writing. Courts, they suggested, should protect free
expression rather than deferring to legislative and executive actions.
Thus, the challenge for the new civil libertarians: how could they justify
governmental regulations in the economic realm but oppose them in the
expressive realm?146 Some prewar constitutional theorists such as John
Burgess and Thomas Cooley, influenced by libertarian concepts, had
linked economic and expressive liberties. These earlier and more
conservative libertarians had argued that, whether in the economic or
expressive realm, government should minimize regulations and thus
maximize individual liberty. 147 How, then, could the new libertarians
differentiate between economic and expressive liberties? Why should
courts be less concerned with protecting liberty of contract while more
concerned with protecting liberty of expression?
4 8
Chafee attempted to respond to this dilemma, first in an article
published in the June 1919 issue of the Harvard Law Review and then in
a book published the following year. The article, Freedom of Speech in
War Time, restated and elaborated the argument from his first New
Republic essay, while the book, Freedom of Speech, in turn elaborated
and extended the argument from his article. In the Harvard article,
Chafee quickly arrived at the question that animated his earlier essay: "to
determine where the line runs between utterance which is protected by
the Constitution from governmental control and that which is not.'
4 9
Chafee then reviewed the history of suppression and free expression to
show one way not to draw the line: through the application of a bad-
tendency standard. The "lesson" of history, Chafee wrote, was that "the
most essential element of free speech is the rejection of bad tendency as
the test of a criminal utterance .,,50 Instead, and again like in the New
146. See generally GRABER, supra note 5, at 75-121.
147. See, e.g., JOHN W. BURGESS, THE RECONCILIATION OF GOVERNMENT
WITH LIBERTY 358-83 (1915).
148. See GRABER, supra note 5, at 75-12 1.
149. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 938.
150. Id. at 953.
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Republic essay, Chafee located the line by emphasizing the value of free
and open expression in a societal search for truth. "The true meaning of
freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most important purposes
of society and government is the discovery and spread of truth on
subjects of general concern. This is possible only through absolutely
unlimited discussion . . . . Chafee did not argue, though, that this
social interest rendered free expression an absolute right. "[T]here are
other purposes of government, such as order, the training of the young,
protection against external aggression."' 5 2  Given that "[u]nlimited
discussion sometimes interferes with these purposes . . ." they sometimes
"must then be balanced against freedom of speech ... In the context
of wartime and the Espionage Act,
[t]he true boundary line of the First Amendment
can be fixed only when Congress and the courts
realize that the principle on which speech is
classified as lawful or unlawful involves the
balancing against each other of two very important
social interests, in public safety and in the search
for truth. Every reasonable attempt should be
made to maintain both interests unimpaired .... 154
But, as Chafee underscored, one must be careful not to underestimate the
social value of free expression in the search for truth. "[F]reedom of
151. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 956; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
supra note 46, at 34. Chafee added:
The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free
speech. There is an individual interest, the need of many
men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life
is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment
of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest
course of action but carry it out in the wisest way. This
social interest is especially important in war time.
Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 958; CHAFEE, supra note 46, at 36.
152. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 956-957; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, supra note 46, at 34 (alterations added).
153. Id. at 957; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 34 (alterations
added).
154. Id. at 959-60; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 38
(alteration added).
2008] INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HOLMES
speech ought to weigh very heavily in the scale. The First Amendment
gives binding force to this principle of political wisdom."
'' 55
In light of the gravity accorded to free expression by the First
Amendment, what test or standard might usefully identify the border
between protected and unprotected expression in any particular case?
Chafee reiterated his conclusion based on history: we "can with certitude
declare that the First Amendment forbids the punishment of words
merely for their injurious tendencies.,,156  So, if the bad-tendency
standard does not distinguish between protected and unprotected
expression, then what does? Here, Chafee drew upon the Schenck case,
decided subsequently to the publication of Chafee's New Republic essay
but before the Harvard article. In particular, Chafee quoted (and
italicized) Holmes's clear and present danger language: "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."'57  As Chafee rephrased the test in the context of wartime,
"speech should be unrestricted by the censorship or by punishment,
unless it is clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference with
the conduct of war."
158
To Chafee, that is, the clear and present danger test marked the
line between protected and unprotected expression. Yet, recall, Holmes
had apparently intended his clear and present danger language in Schenck
155. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 957 (alteration added). In a
subsequent article as well as in his book, Chafee underscored that the First
Amendment protected more than political expression. Put in different words, the
search-for-truth rationale was broader than what would eventually be called the self-
governance rationale. "The policy behind it [the First Amendment] is the
attainment and spread of truth, not merely as an abstraction, but as the basis of
political and social progress. 'Freedom of speech and of the press' is to be
unabridged because it is the only means of testing out the truth. The Constitution
does not pare down this freedom to political affairs only or to the opinions which are
held by a majority of the people in opposition to the government." CHAFEE,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 156; Chafee, Abrams, supra note 46, at 771
(alteration added).
156. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 60; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
supra note 46, at 39.
157. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 967 (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 960; CHAFEE, supra note 46, at 38.
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to reiterate the bad-tendency standard. Chafee clearly meant otherwise,
as he unequivocally repudiated bad tendency. In appropriating Holmes's
clear and present danger phrasing, Chafee intended to imbue it with
greater vitality. Indeed, Chafee construed the clear and present danger
standard as if it "substantially agrees" with Learned Hand's direct
incitement standard from Masses Publishing.159 Chafee, however, did
not equate the two tests. While a direct incitement approach, according
to Chafee, focused on the spoken or written words in the abstract, the
clear and present danger test required an assessment of their likely
effects in the circumstances of the case. Thus, for instance, Mark
Antony's funeral oration, which "counselled violence while it expressly
discountenanced it," would be protected expression under a direct
incitement approach but would be punishable under Chafee's iteration of
the clear and present danger test. 60 To Chafee, then, "our problem of
locating the boundary line of free speech is solved. It is fixed close to
the point where words will give rise to unlawful acts."' 61 By shaping the
clear and present danger test to subsume a direct incitement approach,
Chafee transformed clear and present danger from a bad tendency test to
a near-overt acts test. If Holmes's Schenck language were to be
meaningful, Chafee concluded, then it must protect any speech or writing
that falls short of creating "'a clear and present danger' of overt acts."'
162
Consequently, as Chafee added in his book, the government can "meet
violence with violence, since there is no other method."'' 63 But when an
individual utters words that merely offend us, however seriously, the
solution is counter-speech rather than suppression. "[A]gainst opinions,
agitation, [and] bombastic threats, [the government] has another
weapon,-language. Words as such should be fought with their own
kind, and force called in against them only to head off violence when that
159. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 967.
160. Id. at 964.
161. Id. at 960; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 38.
162. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 968. Thus, "the great interest in free
speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in public safety is really
imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it is barely conceivable that it may be
slightly affected." Id. at 960; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 38;
see White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 429 (describing Chafee's interpretation
of Holmes's clear and present danger language as "astonishing").
163. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 158.
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is sure to follow the utterances before there is a chance for counter-
argument."
64
How, then, did Chafee differentiate the emerging civil libertarian
position from the earlier conservative libertarian view? How did Chafee
justify the broad protection of liberty of expression without analogously
justifying the broad protection of liberty of contract? He did so in two
ways. First, Chafee consistently characterized free expression as a First
Amendment rather than a due-process right. Expressive liberties were
not akin to economic liberties. The First Amendment extended special
protection to free speech and a free press. Second, Chafee stressed that
free expression serves a substantial social interest, the search for truth.
Thus, even when the government asserted that legislation was needed to
pursue some other interest, such as public safety, the government would
not then necessarily have free reign to suppress speech and writing.
Instead, the social interest in free expression (the search for truth) would
need to be weighed against the social interest in public safety. Moreover,
in striking this balance, a court should always remember that the First
Amendment accorded free expression significant weight. In short, free
expression would most often outweigh other social interests, according to
Chafee.
Chafee's balancing approach to free expression was derived
partly from the Progressive or sociological jurisprudence of his mentor,
Roscoe Pound. 165 In two articles published in 1915, Pound distinguished
among three types of interests: individual, public ("interests of the state
as a juristic person"), and social ("interests of the community at
large"). 166 But, Pound added, "[s]trictly the concern of the law is with
social interests.', 167 In fact, Pound repeatedly demonstrated how social
interests took priority over individual interests. The legal system, to
Pound, evolved through a balance of various social interests; an
individual interest would be legally protected only if there arose a social
interest in securing it. 168 The problem, according to Pound, "ultimately is
not to balance individual interests [or rights] and social interests, but to
164. Id. (alterations added).
165. SMITH, supra note 66, at 6, 86.
166. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 343-44
(1915).
167. Id. at 344 (alteration added).
168. Id. at 346-49.
balance this social interest [in individual rights] with other social
interests and to weigh how far securing this or that individual interest is a
suitable means of achieving the result which such a balancing
demands." 69 In this regard, the individual interest "in free belief and
opinion," or that is, in free expression, was not unique: the law would
protect it when it furthered a social value or interest and when other
social interests did not outweigh it.'70  Significantly, then, Pound and
other Progressive jurisprudents did not repudiate republican democracy.
To the contrary, they sought to determine the common good more
accurately through the empirical evaluation of various social interests.
Thus, when Pound advocated for ascertaining the balance among social
interests and then pursuing that result, he was merely reiterating
traditional republican democratic principles, albeit in more sociological
terminology. Social interests were those interests or values that were
relevant to ascertaining the communal or common good.
Likewise, Chafee articulated an argument for an expansive
concept of free expression that remained harmonious with traditional
republican democratic principles. He did not argue that individual rights
or liberties, particularly free expression, took priority over the common
good. He did not argue that an individual right to free expression was
inviolate. Rather, in effect, he argued that in most circumstances the
broad protection of free expression was itself for the common good.
Chafee acknowledged that there are individual interests, including an
individual interest in free expression. But it is the social interest in free
expression-the search for truth-that is "especially important,"
particularly during wartime.17' The "great trouble" with most Espionage
Act decisions, Chafee explained, was that judges viewed free expression
as solely an individual interest. And of course, under republican
democracy, any individual interest or right was subordinate to the
common good, including public safety during wartime. Hence, Chafee's
argument turned on his identification of free expression with a weighty
169. Id. at 349 (alterations added).
170. Roscoe Pound, Interests in Personality (Part II), 28 HARV. L. REv. 445,
454-56 (1915). Pound did not conclude that a balance of social interests necessarily
led to an expansive concept of free expression. Rabban, Progressive, supra note 5,
at 998-1001.
171. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 957-58.
172. Id. at 959.
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social interest or value that needed to be accounted for when determining
the common good.
V. HOLMES'S TRANSFORMATION
Four months would pass between the publication of Chafee's
Harvard article and the argument of the next two Supreme Court
Espionage Act cases, Abrams v. United States 73 and Schaefer v. United
States.174 During that time, Holmes went through a transformation, of a
sort. Why? No precise answer can be given, but a number of factors
seem relevant. By the time the World War I cases arose, Holmes was in
his mid-seventies and had been sitting on the Court for more than fifteen
years. He had been raised in a Boston Brahmin family, in the shadow of
his father, a famous writer and doctor (in fact, his father had coined the
term, Boston Brahmin). Thus, despite his many accomplishments,
175
Holmes believed for many decades that he unjustly toiled in obscurity.
Sparked partly by his dissent in Lochner v. New York 176-the Court had
held that Progressive legislation limiting the hours of employees in
bakeries violated due process liberty to contract-Holmes's seeming
obscurity metamorphosed into celebrity during the early 1910s.
Numerous luminaries in political journalism as well as in the legal
profession, including many young Progressives, praised Holmes and
sought his friendship. Herbert Croly, Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand,
Harold Laski, and Walter Lippmann were within his circle 
of admirers. 177
Holmes, quite reasonably, valued his stature among such a distinguished
group of acolytes. He wrote to British diplomat Lewis Einstein: "Do you
see the New Republic? It is rather solemn for my taste; but the young
men who write in it are, some of them, friends of mine, which doesn't
prevent an occasional, flattering reference to this old man, and I get great
173. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
174. 251 U.S. 466, 479 (1920).
175. For discussions of Holmes's frustrations, see ALSCHULER, supra note 7, at
78-79, 181-84; Bogen, supra note 7, at 131-33; White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5,
at 408-12.
176. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
177. For discussions of Holmes's desire for recognition and the development
of his cadre of admirers, see ALSCHULER, supra note 7, at 78-79, 181-84; Bogen,
supra note 7, at 131-33; White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 408-12.
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pleasure from our occasional talks. They put me on to books that they
think will be good for me, and please me by their latent or expressed
enthusiasm, and their talent."' 78 Holmes would not have wanted to risk
his hard-earned and long-denied preeminence among the young
intelligentsia. Indeed, one of Holmes's former clerks observed that he
was "driven by an unusual longing for recognition.'
179
Most probably, Holmes was surprised when his first three World
War I free-expression opinions provoked critical reactions from his
friends. Less than two months after the Court had issued its Debs and
Frohwerk decisions, for example, the New Republic had published
Freund's essay reproaching Holmes's opinion in Debs. 18  Besides
printed criticisms, Holmes's friends questioned his decisions in personal
exchanges. On June 19, 1918, even before Schenck and Sugarman had
been argued, Holmes and Hand accidentally met on a train going from
New York City to Boston. They discussed suppression, tolerance, andS •• 181
Hands's Masses Publishing decision. This chance meeting led to an
exchange of letters. Hand not only pressed the superiority of his direct-
incitement test but, after Debs and Frohwerk, he also criticized Holmes's
approach in those cases. From Hand's perspective, Holmes allowed
juries, "especially clannish groups," too much power to determine guilt
or innocence, particularly during times of societal crisis. 182 Meanwhile,
Laski often recommended books to Holmes, a voracious reader, and that
summer and early fall Holmes read several volumes related to civil
liberties, suppression, and the nature of truth. 183  More significant
perhaps, Laski also sent Holmes a copy of Chafee's Harvard article. In
178. Letter from Holmes to Einstein (August 12, 1916), reprinted in THE
HOLMES-EINSTErN LETTERS 136 (J.P. Peabody ed. 1964), quoted in Bogen, supra
note 7, at 132; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
179. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1280 n.459.
180. Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 3, 1919, at 13; see Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 968 (criticizing
Holmes).
181. POLENBERG, supra note 5, at 218-19; Gunther, supra note 7, at 732-33.
182. Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 22, 1918),
reprinted in Appendix, Gunther, supra note 7, at 755, 755-56; Letter from Learned
Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (late March, 1919), reprinted in Appendix,
Gunther, supra note 7, at 758, 758-59.
183. POLENBERG, supra note 5, at 223-27.
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fact, the article had so impressed Laski that he invited Holmes to meet
Chafee over tea in July 1919. Before the meeting, Laski wrote to
Chafee: "we must fight on it. I've read it twice, and I'll go to the stake
for every word."'184 So, for Laski and Chafee, the purpose of the tea was
to persuade Holmes to adopt a more speech-protective stance.
Apparently, though, Chafee thought his teatime chat failed, at least
initially. In September, he wrote to Judge Charles Amidon: "I have
talked with Justice Holmes about the article but find that he is inclined to
allow a very wide latitude to Congressional discretion in the carrying on
of the war."'
185
How did Holmes react to these criticisms? At first, he seemed
defensive and even peevish. When Holmes began hearing criticisms
shortly after the Debs decision, he wrote to Frederick Pollock that
"[t]here was a lot of jaw about free speech, which I dealt with somewhat
summarily in ... Schenck v. U.S. [and] also Frohwerk v. U.S.''186 Laski
soon asked Holmes about Freund's New Republic article, which Holmes
denounced as "poor stuff." Holmes explained in a letter to Croly, which
Holmes never sent: "Freund's objection to a jury 'guessing at motive,
tendency and possible effect' is an objection to pretty much the whole
body of the law, which for thirty years I have made my brethren smile by
insisting to be everywhere a matter of degree."' 87  Chafee, while
believing he had not convinced Holmes to change, also believed that his
criticisms had stung. In preparation for writing his book, Chafee had
jotted annotations in the margins of a copy of his Harvard article,
including one comment that "Holmes was a bit hurt at this 
accusation."' 188
At some point, though, Holmes's bruised ego recovered enough
so that he could contemplate the substance of the various criticisms.
Early on, Holmes said he wished the government had not prosecuted so
many individuals under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. 189 On March
184. Ragan, supra note 7, at 43; White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 428.
185. SMITH, supra note 66, at 30; see also White, Justice Holmes, supra note
5, at 430-31.
186. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 7 (alteration added).
187. Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 13, 1919), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note
7, at 203.
188. SMITH, supra note 66, at 32.
189. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 420-21.
16, 1919, he wrote to Laski about his first three Espionage Act opinions:
"I greatly regretted having to write them-and (between ourselves) that
the Government pressed them to a hearing . . . . I should think the
President when he gets through with his present amusements might do• • , , 1 9 0
some pardoning. Less than three weeks later, he wrote to Pollock
about Debs: "I wondered that the Government should press the case to a
hearing before us."' 91 If true, then Holmes apparently did not believe
these prosecutions too important. The government did not need to send
Schenck, Frohwerk, or Debs to jail. "I could not see the wisdom of
pressing the cases," he wrote to Laski, "especially when the fighting was
over and I think it quite possible that if I had been on the jury I should
have been for acquittal."' 92 In a letter to Pollock, Holmes even claimed
that "I should go farther probably than the majority in favor of [free
speech].' 93
Chafee's Harvard article, then, became crucial; it provided
Holmes with a roadmap. First, recognize that free expression promoted
an important social interest-a common good. The war effort and public
safety were not the only social interests at stake in an Espionage Act
case. Next, Holmes should follow his own clear and present danger test,
as initially articulated in Schenck but now with a different gloss. Finally,
find that the First Amendment protected the speech of a few
defendants-insignificant defendants, from Holmes's perspective-
whom the government did not need to prosecute in the first place. If
Holmes followed this route, marked by Chafee, then Holmes would once
again be in the good graces of his young admirers. Holmes may not have
wanted to be one of the new civil libertarians, but he certainly hoped to
continue being "a figure of authority and eminence" among them.'94
The government indicted Jacob Abrams and six others for
printing and distributing 5,000 leaflets in violation of the amended
190. Letter from Holmes to Laski (March 16, 1919), HOLMES-LASKI, supra
note 7, at 189, 190.
191. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 7.
192. Letter from Holmes to Laski (May 13, 1919), HOLMEs-LASKI, supra note
7, at 203.
193. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (April 5, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 7 (alteration added).
194. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 411.
232 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 6
2008] INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HOLMES
Espionage Act, Section III. One leaflet was entitled, The Hypocrisy of
the United States and Her Allies. It protested Wilson's decision to send
American troops to Russia toward the end of the war: "'Our' President
Wilson, with his beautiful phraseology, has hypnotized the people of
America to such an extent that they do not see his hypocrisy . . .His
shameful, cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia reveals the
hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington ..... ,,95 Abrams and
his colleagues had attempted to distribute the leaflets by throwing them
from the roofs of several Manhattan buildings.196 From the time of the
arrests, the result of the prosecutions seemed foreordained. During the
post-arrest interviews, the police reportedly beat and humiliated the
prisoners. Subsequent police denials of torture rang hollow given that
one indicted defendant died in jail, apparently beaten to death.'
97
Throughout the trial of the remaining six defendants, the judge, former
United States Senator Henry Clayton, was hostile and biased. Before the
defendants began presenting evidence, Clayton explained to the jury:
"Now the charge in this case is, in its very nature, that these defendants,
by what they have done, conspired to go and incite a revolt; in fact, one
of the very papers is signed 'Revolutionists,' and it was for the purpose
of ... raising a state of public opinion in this country of hostility to the
Government .... Now, they cannot do that. No man can do that, and
that is the theory that I have of this case, and we might as well have it out
in the beginning.' 98 Clayton's attempt at humor during the trial revealed
much: "I have tried to out-talk an Irishman, and I never can do it, and the
Lord knows I can not out-talk a Jew."' 99 The jury convicted Abrams and
four other defendants, with one acquittal. Before sentencing, Clayton
complained how he had listened to the defendants' attorney discuss
"rot... ad nauseam. ' '200 Yet, Clayton claimed, he sat and listened "to it
all because I did not wish by any act of mine to influence the jury.
'2°
195. POLENBERG, supra note 5, at 49-50.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id. at 66-68, 88-91.
198. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 46, at 137.
199. POLENBERG, supra note 5, at 107, 120-25.
200. Long Prison Terms for the Bolsheviki, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1918, at 18.
201. Id.
233
234 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 6
Clayton sentenced Abrams and two others to twenty years imprisonment;
202one defendant received fifteen years; and the last received three years.
The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, with Justice John
H. Clarke writing the opinion for a seven-justice majority. While Clarke
did not appear as biased as Clayton, Clarke's opinion nonetheless
203accentuated the foreignness and radicalness of the defendants. In
response to their argument that the First Amendment protected their
204writings, Clarke reasoned that Schenck and Frohwerk controlled.
Holmes and Brandeis dissented, with Brandeis joining Holmes's opinion.
So, for the first time in a decided Supreme Court case, Holmes and
201Brandeis together voted to overturn an Espionage Act conviction.
After asserting the correctness of the Court's previous decisions in
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, Holmes reiterated his clear and present
danger language from Schenck. "[T]he United States constitutionally
may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and
202. POLENBERG, supra note 5, at 72, 145.
203. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617-18 (1919).
204. Id. at 618-19; Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error at 42-51, Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (No. 316), reprinted in 19 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 5, at 775, 819-28.
205. In one previous decided case involving free expression, Holmes and
Brandeis dissented together. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402
(1918), overruled by Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). In Toledo
Newspaper, a federal district court judge issued a contempt order pursuant to a
federal statute against the newspaper company and an editor because of articles
criticizing the court. In upholding the contempt order, Chief Justice White's
majority opinion emphasized "the sacred obligation of courts to preserve their right
to discharge their duties free from unlawful and unworthy influences." 247 U.S. at
416.
Holmes wrote a dissent joined by Brandeis. Holmes argued that the
newspaper's publications should not be punished by contempt. His argument was
based, however, not on constitutional protections but on his interpretation of the
applicable contempt statute. "The statute in force at the time of the alleged
contempts confined the power of courts in cases of this sort to where there had been
'misbehavior of any person in their presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice."' Holmes explained: "And when the words of the statute
are read it seems to me that the limit is too plain to be construed away. To my mind
they point only to the present protection of the Court from actual interference, and
not to postponed retribution for lack of respect for its dignity-not to moving to
vindicate its independence after enduring the newspaper's attacks for nearly six
months as the Court did in this case." Id. at 422-23 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive
evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent."
20 6
While Holmes acknowledged that during wartime Congress must protect
against unique dangers, he insisted that "the principle of the right to free
speech is always the same., 20 7 Thus, Congress "cannot forbid all effort
to change the mind of the country. 20 8 In applying the clear and present
danger test to the facts of the case, Holmes stressed that the defendants
were "poor and puny anonymities. '' 20 9 For Holmes, Abrams and his co-
defendants were unimportant, their writings were insignificant, and the
government should not have bothered to prosecute. "[N]obody can
suppose," Holmes wrote, "that the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate
danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms
or have any appreciable tendency to do so."' 210 In short, the government
had not proven clear and present danger because the defendants and their
writings were so inconsequential. When it came to the twenty-year
sentences, Holmes could find only one explanation: the defendants were
"made to suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed that
they avow-a creed that I believe to be the creed of ignorance and
immaturity.' ..
Holmes articulated a theory justifying an expansive concept of
free expression under the first amendment.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
206. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
207. Id. at 627-28.
208. Id. at 628.
209. Id. at 629.
210. Id. at 628 (alteration added).
211. Id. at 629.
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the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,• .212
as all life is an experiment.
Thus, like Chafee, Holmes reasoned that a societal search for
truth justified the broad protection of speech and writing. Moreover, he
then explicitly linked the search-for-truth rationale with the clear and
present danger test. "[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts
to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death," he warned, "unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
,,2 13that an immediate check is required to save the country. From the
Holmesian standpoint, the government generally should allow speech
and writing to flow into a marketplace of ideas. From this free exchange
of ideas, the truth will emerge. Harmful ideas must be met with better
ideas rather than with force or suppression. The only ideas (speech and
writing) that should be restricted are those that would inhibit the further
exchange of ideas. Which ideas would inhibit further exchange? Those
that would engender a clear and present (or imminent) danger of
unlawful or harmful conduct.
Holmes rarely acknowledged the influence of others, and in this
instance, he followed to form. Without admitting as much, Holmes
largely followed Chafee's roadmap. 21 4 As suggested by Chafee, Holmes
claimed that society's search for truth required the broad protection of
free expression. As suggested by Chafee, Holmes appropriated his own
clear and present danger language from Schenck, now with a new gloss.
Instead of equating clear and present danger with bad tendency, he
reinterpreted it as highly protective of expression. And as suggested by
Chafee, Holmes found that the First Amendment protected the speech of
215a few (insignificant) defendants. Eventually, in a letter to Laski on
212. Id. at 630 (alteration added).
213. Id. (alteration added).
214. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 430-3 1.
215. Holmes might have been further following Chafee when he (Holmes)
concluded that the First Amendment did not leave "the common law as to seditious
libel in force." Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Chafee, War Time,
supra note 46, at 967.
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December 17, 1920, Holmes called Chafee's Harvard article "first rate,"
216though he still did not openly admit that it might have influenced him.
Yet, Holmes did not follow Chafee's directions exactly. Holmes
added a few of his own turns. Unlike Chafee, Holmes explicitly
analogized the societal search for truth to the economic marketplace-
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market." 217 Holmes here more than turned a
clever phrase. Neither Holmes nor Chafee, it should be noted, invented
this basic rationale for free expression, that a free exchange of ideas
would lead to truth; it could be traced back to Milton and had been
reiterated in 1859 by the British philosopher, John Stuart Mill (in fact,
Holmes had recently reread Mill's On Liberty)." 8 Regardless, while
Chafee, in invoking this rationale, might have been more interested in
separating free expression from economic liberties, Holmes seized upon
the current, if controversial, passion for the economic marketplace to
bolster his argument. Chafee talked of the value of "unlimited
discussion," but Holmes suggested that ideas (speech and writing)
operated like products in an economic marketplace. 219  Consumers
should have the opportunity to choose, unburdened by governmental
restrictions-whether choosing products or ideas. At the same time,
Chafee's article might have implicitly suggested the marketplace
metaphor to Holmes. When Chafee articulated his search-for-truth
rationale, he mentioned the English journalist, Walter Bagehot,, who
wrote extensively on economic issues. Thus, while Chafee did not
expressly analogize the search for truth to an economic marketplace, he
alluded to economics through his reference to Bagehot.220 The erudite
216. Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec. 17, 1920), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note
7, at 297.
217. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
218. Holmes wrote Laski a letter mere days before the Court handed down the
Schenck decision (March 3, 1919), stating that he had "reread Mill on Liberty-fine
old sportsman." Letter from Holmes to Laski (Feb. 28, 1919), HOLMES-LASKI,
supra note 7, at 186-87. Holmes had visited Mill in 1867. ROBERT HARGREAVES,
THE FIRST FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH 252 (Sutton 2002).
219. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 956; JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 21-27 (1859; Liberal Arts Press ed. 1956). Holmes did not use the precise
phrase, "marketplace of ideas." See Blasi, supra note 7, at 13, n.41, 24, 80 (on the
first uses of this phrase, more than fifteen years after Holmes's Abrams dissent).
220. Chafee, War Time, supra note 46, at 956.
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Holmes, who occasionally mentioned Bagehot in letters, most likely
understood Chafee's allusion and rendered it more striking and
precise.221 Even though Holmes had dissented in Lochner v. New
York,222 partly because he believed the majority had overemphasized the
importance of an unregulated economic marketplace, Holmes apparently
recognized in Abrams that a marketplace metaphor would vividly
symbolize to his contemporaries a realm largely beyond governmental
control.
Holmes departed from Chafee in additional ways. Holmes
explicitly linked the search-for-truth rationale to the clear and present
danger test. Intertwined together, both the rationale and the test seemed
stronger. The search for truth no longer was a mere academic theory;
223
now it appeared to have specific and concrete doctrinal implications.
And the clear and present danger test became more than a doctrinal
framework that might help resolve cases. Shaped (or reshaped) by
Holmes's hands, it became a solid doctrinal structure arising from a firm
philosophical foundation. Finally, though unclear, Holmes's rendition of
the clear and present danger test in Abrams may not have been as
rigorous as Chafee would have wanted. In his Harvard article, Chafee
sculpted clear and present danger to be a near-overt acts test. Holmes's
dissent, to be sure, invigorated clear and present danger by grounding it
on the search for truth, but Holmes may have been unwilling to push the
224clear and present danger test to the same extreme as Chafee had done.
Regardless of the precise points at which Holmes either followed
or departed from Chafee's analysis, Holmes undoubtedly had changed.
Viewed from an external standpoint, Holmes's conception of free
221. See e.g., Letter from Holmes to Laski (March 11, 1922), HOLMEs-LASKI,
supra note 7, at 409-10, 529; cf., Blasi, supra note 7, at 4-13, 45 (criticizing the
application of the marketplace metaphor to ideas and suggesting an alternative
reading of Holmes's Abrams dissent).
222. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
223. From Holmes's pragmatic perspective, the move beyond theory to
practice was significant. "Little as I believe in [free speech] as a theory I hope I
would die for it and I go as far as anyone whom I regard as competent to form an
opinion, in favor of it. Of course when I say I don't believe in it as a theory I don't
mean that I do believe in the opposite as a theory." Letter from Holmes to Laski
(Oct. 26, 1919), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note 7, at 217 (alteration added).
224. See White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 439-40 (discussing
differences between Holmes and Chafee).
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expression transformed. Recall, in previous cases, Holmes had
consistently voted to uphold the criminal punishment of speech and
writing. And in a long list of those cases-Debs, Frohwerk, Schenck,
Fox, and Patterson-he had written the majority opinion. Thus,
Holmes's dissenting vote in Abrams, together with his rationale for
dissenting, that the First Amendment protected the defendants' writings,
demonstrated a significant change. True, Holmes's unpublished dissent
in Baltzer had revealed a willingness to strike down an Espionage Act
prosecution. Even so, his Baltzer dissent had focused on statutory
construction, and where it had alluded to free expression, it had reiterated
the bad-tendency standard (expression is unprotected if it can "be
imagined to do harm"). 225 Holmes's subsequent reiterations of the bad
tendency approach in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs underscored that he
had not intended to repudiate that standard in Baltzer. Thus, when
Holmes applied the clear and present danger test rigorously in Abrams to
argue that the convictions should be overturned, he was not applying the
same test that he had applied in Schenck, where clear and present danger
equated with bad tendency. The Abrams clear and present danger test
was an innovative doctrinal standard for determining the scope of free
expression, a standard far more protective than any before articulated by
the Supreme Court. In sum, Holmes's vote to dissent in Abrams and his
expressed rationale justifying his dissent appeared to suggest an
unprecedented appreciation, on Holmes's part, for free expression and its
contributions to society.
Yet, from an internal standpoint, Holmes never personally
believed and therefore never publicly admitted that he had changed. - At
most, Holmes eventually acknowledged to Chafee in June 1922 that he
had "wrongly" accepted the Blackstonian view of free expression (that
226only prior restraints are prohibited). Otherwise, Holmes consistently
maintained both that the Court's prior free-expression decisions were all
correct and that he had always believed strongly in free expression, even
though neither he nor the Court had ever previously found any specific
225. Holmes's dissent, joined by Brandeis, in the Toledo Newspaper case,
arising from a contempt of court, further demonstrated Holmes's willingness to
interpret a statute so as to disallow the punishment of expression. Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425 (1918).
226. Bogen, supra note 7, at 99-100 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922)).
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speech or writing constitutionally protected. At the outset of his Abrams
dissent, when he turned to the First Amendment issue, he immediately
reaffirmed the correctness of the Court's earlier decisions in Schenck,
227
Frohwerk, and Debs. Then, in a letter to Pollock written just over a
month after Abrams was decided, Holmes again defended his earlier
decisions, arguing that his votes in the first cases were justified on the
228
facts. Yet, in an October 26, 1919, letter to Laski, written after
Holmes had decided to dissent in Abrams but before the decision was
handed down, Holmes declared: "I hope I would die for [freedom of
speech] and I go as far as anyone whom I regard as competent to form an
opinion, in favor of it."'229 He repeated that sentiment, his willingness to
"die" for free expression, in a letter written to Pollock on the same
day.23° As a general matter, Holmes rarely admitted that he had been
wrong or had changed his mind on any issue, whether involving free
expression or otherwise.23 Thus, in his October 26 letter to Pollock,
Holmes unsurprisingly added: "It is one of the ironies that I, who
probably take the extremest view in favor of free speech .... have been
selected for blowing up."' 2 3 2 From Holmes's vantage, he did not deserve
to be criticized; his friends' had been mistaken. In Holmes's next letter
to Pollock, only days before Abrams was handed down, he explained that
he was "stirred" about a dissent he had sent to the other justices. He then
wrote: "I feel sure that the majority will very highly disapprove of my
saying what I think, but as yet it seems to me my duty. '233 "Now!" with
his Abrams dissent, he seemed to say to his friends, "I will show you
how I really feel (or think) about free expression-in terms that you
cannot misunderstand."
227. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627.
228. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 32.
229. Letter from Holmes to Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note
7, at 217 (alteration added).
230. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 29.
231. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1267.
232. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 29.
233. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Nov. 6, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 29 (emphasis added).
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How could Holmes change his position on free expression so
significantly without admitting as much to himself or to others?
Chafee's roadmap helped. It provided Holmes with the precise terms
that, when adopted by Holmes, would plainly show his friends his true
commitment to free expression. Plus, since Chafee himself had
appropriated Holmes's clear and present danger language from Schenck,
Holmes could follow Chafee while still insisting that he was consistently
following his own position, as previously established in Schenck.
Through the traditional judicial mechanism of analogical reasoning-
reasoning from one case to another-Holmes could maintain in Abrams
that he was merely following the principle of an earlier case, Schenck-
even if, in reality, the application of the clear and present danger test in
Abrams resembled that in Schenck only in the most nominal fashion.
Moreover, and of great importance, Holmes sincerely proclaimed that he
had always believed in free expression-but it was the free expression
that the majority of jurists and legal scholars believed in at the time. It
was free expression as a liberty within a regime of republican
democracy, a liberty subordinate to governmental actions for the
common good. When Holmes followed Chafee's roadmap, his concept
of free expression remained unchanged-a liberty subordinate to
governmental actions for the common good. But following Chafee,
Holmes for the first time gave free expression itself significant value
when determining the common good, even if Holmes neither recognized
nor acknowledged any novel appreciation, on his part, for speech and
writing.
Finally, Holmes could readily flip-flop his position on these free-
expression cases, whether he admitted it or not, exactly because he
considered them relatively unimportant. To Holmes, even after Abrams,
these cases were mundane criminal appeals. In the October 26 letter to
Pollock, written after Holmes had prepared his Abrams dissent, Holmes
expressed the "hope that we have heard the last, or nearly the last, of the
Espionage Act cases." 234 Even after Holmes had written his Abrams
dissent articulating a rigorous clear and present danger test, he still
believed that free-expression cases were not worth much time or energy.
In the entire series of Espionage Act cases, from Holmes's perspective,
234. Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919), HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 28.
241
the government had acted no less silly than had the defendants. The
defendants had spoken or written nonsense, Holmes believed, and the
government had prosecuted them for it. Surely, the government should
have attended to more important matters, especially during a war. As
Holmes explained in a letter to Hand, people tended "to fight" about
issues that they intensely cared about; on other issues, they would not be
235
as passionate. With regard to the issue of free expression, Holmes did
not care enough to fight. In a July 7, 1918, letter to Laski, Holmes
wrote: "My thesis would be (1) if you are cocksure, and (2) if you want it
very much, and (3) if you have no doubt of your power-you will do
what you believe efficient to bring about what you want-by legislation
or otherwise." But, Holmes added, "In most matters of belief we are not
cocksure-we don't care very much-and we are not certain of our
power. ' ,236 Holmes himself just did not "care very much" about free
expression.
Despite Holmes's indifference toward free expression, he
succeeded wildly in regaining the good graces of his acolytes, who now
showered him with fawning praise. Just two days after Abrams had been
decided, Laski wrote to Holmes: "amongst the many opinions of yours I
have read, none seems to me superior either in nobility or outlook, in
dignity or phrasing, and in that quality the French call justesse, as this
dissent.' ,237 Felix Frankfurter expressed "the gratitude and.., the pride I
have in your dissent," and thanked Holmes for providing needed
"education in the obvious. 238  Writing in the Harvard Law Review,
Chafee extolled "Justice Holmes' magnificent exposition of the
239
philosophic basis" of the First Amendment. In a New Republic essay
entitled The Call to Toleration, the editors focused on "the remarkable
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes," whom they described as
"conspicuous at once for his learning, his grasp of juristic principles and
235. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918)
reprinted in Appendix, Gunther, supra note 7, at 757.
236. Letter from Holmes to Laski (July 7, 1918), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note
7, at 160-61.
237. Letter from Laski to Holmes (Nov. 12, 1919), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note
7, at 220.
238. White, Justice Holmes, supra note 5, at 441 (quoting a Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Nov. 12, 1919).
239. Chafee, Abrams, supra note 46, at 769.
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his political wisdom." In "memorable words," Holmes had "expressed
with unusual breadth and vivacity the theory about the function of
freedom of speech and assemblage in the American political system
which all patriotic citizens used to share and to consider one of its great,• .. ,,240
and peculiar merits.
Schaefer v. United States was argued the same day as Abrams
but decided more than three months later, on March 1, 1920.241 Peter
Schaefer and four other defendants were convicted under the Espionage
Act for publishing a German-language newspaper that had allegedly
denounced and falsely reported on the American war effort. Justice
Joseph McKenna wrote the majority opinion affirming three convictions;
two were reversed because insufficient evidence connected the
defendants to the publications. McKenna, in explaining the affirmed
convictions, emphasized that the Court would not allow anarchists and
enemies of the United States to use the Constitution as a shield when
they sought to destroy constitutional government. 242 Once again, the
243Court applied the Act consistently with the bad-tendency standard.
Schaefer is noteworthy, however, because Brandeis wrote his
first free-expression dissent, joined by Holmes. Arguing that the
convictions of all defendants should have been reversed, Brandeis
immediately focused on the issue of free expression and quoted
Holmes's clear and present danger language from Schenck.244 The bulk
of Brandeis's opinion then reviewed the evidence and concluded that it
was insufficient to prove a clear and present danger. Brandeis explicitly
distinguished the bad tendency and clear and present danger approaches
and, unlike Holmes, explicitly cited Chafee.
It is not apparent on a reading of this article...
how it could rationally be held to tend even
remotely or indirectly to obstruct recruiting. But as
this court has declared and as Professor Chafee has
240. Editors, The Call to Toleration, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1919, at 360,
360-61.
241. 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
242. Id. at 477-79.
243. "Their effect or the persons affected could not be shown, nor was it
necessary. The tendency of the articles and their efficacy were enough for offense..
and to have required more would have made the law useless." Id. at 479.
244. Id. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
shown in his 'Freedom of Speech in War Time,' [in
the Harvard Law Review] the test to be applied-as
in the case of criminal attempts and incitements-
is not the remote or possible effect. There must be
the clear and present danger.245
In other words, even though Brandeis quoted the clear and
present danger test from Schenck, he understood it as highly speech-
protective, in accordance with Holmes's Abrams dissent and Chafee's
article.
CONCLUSION
The Court upheld yet another group of Espionage Act
convictions in Pierce v. United States,246 with Brandeis again writing a
dissent joined by Holmes. Like in Schaefer, Brandeis focused on
showing that the evidence was insufficient to prove a clear and present
danger.24' And in a subsequent case, Milwaukee Social Democratic
Publishing Company v. Burleson,248 not decided until 1921, the Court
again upheld an Espionage Act conviction. Brandeis dissented, again
closely analyzing the facts and again citing Chafee.249 Holmes wrote a
separate dissent, saying little more than that he agreed "in substance"
with Brandeis.250 Between these two cases, though, the Court decided
Gilbert v. Minnesota, arising from a state prosecution. Joseph Gilbert
was convicted for making a public speech that violated a state statute
proscribing interference with or discouragement of "the enlistment of
men in the military or naval forces of the United States or of the state of
Minnesota. ' '252 Gilbert had stated:
We are going over to Europe to make the world
safe for democracy, but I tell you we had better
make America safe for democracy first. You say,
245. Id. at 486 (alteration added).
246. 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
247. Id. at 267-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
248. 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
249. Id. at 417-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 436 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
251. 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
252. Id. at 326.
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what is the matter with our democracy? I tell you
what is the matter with it: Have you had anything
to say as to who should be [P]resident? Have you
had anything to say as to who should be Governor
of this state? Have you had anything to say as to
whether we would go into this war? You know
you have not. If this is such a good democracy, for
Heaven's sake why should we not vote on
conscription of men? We were stampeded into this
war by newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts
out of the fire for her. I tell you if they conscripted
wealth like they have conscripted men, this war
would not last over forty-eight hours 
....253
McKenna wrote the majority opinion upholding the conviction.
Gilbert argued that the Constitution protected his speech, and in so
doing, he implicitly raised the issue of whether First Amendment
protections applied against state governments. The Court, however,
bypassed this issue, assumed arguendo that the First Amendment
applied, and decided the case on the merits. Concluding that the speech
was unprotected, McKenna again, like in Schaefer, emphasized that the
Court would not allow a defendant to invoke the Constitution as a shield
for expression harmful to the nation's interests: "It would be a travesty
on the constitutional privilege [that Gilbert] invokes to assign him its
protection.,254
Brandeis wrote a dissent that reached the issue of whether the
constitutional protection of speech and writing applies against state
governments. According to Brandeis, "[t]he right to speak freely
concerning functions of the Federal Government is a privilege or
immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State was powerless to
curtail. ' '255 Brandeis, in other words, located a right to free expression,
enforceable against state governments, in the privileges and immunities
clause of article four: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Thus,
253. Id. at 327.
254. Id. at 333 (alteration added).
255. Id. at 337 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
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unlike Holmes and Chafee, Brandeis more closely tied free expression to
self-government, though he also alluded to the search-for-truth rationale.
The right of a citizen of the United States to take
part, for his own or the country's benefit, in the
making of federal laws and in the conduct of the
Government, necessarily includes the right to speak
or write about them; to endeavor to make his own
opinion concerning laws existing or contemplated
prevail; and, to this end, to teach the truth as he
sees it.
256
Because Congress had "the exclusive power to legislate
concerning the Army and Navy," Brandeis reasoned, citizens had a right
to discuss the propriety of any congressional actions related to the
military, with one exception: "when those charged with the responsibility
of Government, faced with clear and present danger,... conclude that• .. ,,257
suppression of divergent opinion is imperative. Regardless, Brandeis
did not resolve that Minnesota had violated Gilbert's right to free
expression. Instead, Brandeis reasoned that Congress, by passing the
Espionage Act, had preempted the field. Congress had left no room for
states to pass laws regulating speech or writing related to the war, the
draft, and the military. Finally, Brandeis concluded by comparing free
expression with liberty of contract. He did not need to reach the issue of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment protected free expression vis-a-vis
state governments, he acknowledged. But so long as his Supreme Court
colleagues continued to find liberty of contract protected, he could not
understand how they could not find liberty of expression similarly
protected.25 8
Gilbert is critical because Holmes neither joined Brandeis's
dissent nor wrote his own. Instead, Holmes concurred in the judgment,
259though not in the majority's opinion. Why would Holmes have voted
to uphold the conviction? Unfortunately, because Holmes did not write
an opinion, one is left to conjecture. Three different explanations are
256. Id. at 337-38.
257. Id. at 336, 338.
258. Id. at 343. Chief Justice White also dissented because of preemption. Id.
at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 334 (Holmes, J., concurring in judgment).
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possible.260  First, Holmes might have concurred in the majority's
judgment because he believed the constitutional guarantee of free
expression did not apply against state governments. State governments,
according to this position, remained free to suppress expression as they
saw fit, subject to other constitutional limitations. But then why would
Holmes not write a concurring opinion expressing this important
conclusion?
Second, Holmes might have agreed with the majority's
conclusion because in applying the clear and present danger test, as
Holmes then understood it, Gilbert's speech was unprotected. Indeed,
Holmes wrote to Pollock in December 1919 admitting doubt even about
his vote in Abrams because the record, after all, might have contained
sufficient evidence to support convictions on one of the counts in the
indictment.26 And Holmes might have viewed the evidence in Gilbert as
being far stronger than in Abrams, not because of the content of the
respective messages but because of the identities of the respective
communicators. Unlike in Abrams, where Holmes had described the
defendants as "poor and puny anonymities," 262 Gilbert was a well-
known Minnesota leader of the National Nonpartisan League, "one of the
most successful third-party movements in United States 
history.' 263
Gilbert thus might have wielded real influence. His speech might have
successfully induced his audience to question whether the governmental
decisions to go to war and to institute a draft were reached through fair
264
democratic processes. To Holmes, in other words, Gilbert's speech
might have constituted a clear and present danger. Again, though, why
would Holmes not write a concurring opinion clarifying his
interpretation of the clear and present danger test? Perhaps, he did not
260. See Rogat & O'Fallon, supra note 7, at 1391-92 (discussing Holmes's
concurrence).
261. Holmes wrote: "I think it possible that I was wrong in thinking that there
was no evidence on the Fourth Count in consequence of my attention being absorbed
by the two leaflets that were set forth." Nonetheless, he continued: "But I still am
of opinion that I was right." Letter from Holmes to Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919),
HOLMES-POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 32.
262. 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
263. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 103.
264. Graber, supra note 5, at 111-12.
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want to risk losing his friends' praises, still flowing from his Abrams
dissent.
Third, Holmes might have concurred in Gilbert because he
simply had not thought much about the case. Free speech remained a
relatively unimportant issue to him. Indeed, he might not have discerned
the ramifications of his own Abrams dissent (or Brandeis's Schaefer
dissent, for that matter), not because the issues were too complex for
Holmes to grasp-this certainly was not true-but because he did not
care. For Holmes, all the talk about free speech was, still, just talk, and
265not worth a whole lot of time or energy. The world turned because of
power. In a letter to Laski written during the war, Holmes explained that
the "only limit that I can see to the power of the law-maker is the limit of
power as a question of fact.' ' 266  Legal doctrine and theory were
inconsequential if not backed by the threat of force. Thus, Holmes
added, "I understand by human rights what a given crowd will fight for
(successfully). ' '267 Finally, he concluded, "when men differ in taste as to
the kind of world they want the only thing left to do is to go to work
killing. ' 268 Likewise, he admitted in a letter to Hand that he defined
"truth as the majority vote of that nation that can lick all others., 269 But
if Holmes did not give the Gilbert case much thought--exactly because
it was a free-expression case-why did he concur rather than join
Brandeis's dissent (or dissent without opinion)? Perhaps because, while
he willingly garnered praise for his ostensibly speech-protective Abrams
dissent, Holmes genuinely believed he had never changed his position on
free expression. And, to his mind, his unwavering position still closely
resonated with his Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs majority opinions, not
with his Abrams dissent.
All three possible explanations of Holmes's concurrence in the
judgment in Gilbert point to one overarching conclusion: even after
Abrams, Holmes still did not intend to become a strong proponent of a
265. See Graber, supra note 5, at 109 (discussing Holmes's attitude).
266. Letter from Holmes to Laski (Dec. 3, 1917), HOLMES-LASKI, supra note
7, at 115.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 116; see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REv. 457 passim (1897) (presenting Holmes's positivist theory of law).
269. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918)
reprinted in Appendix, Gunther, supra note 7, at 757.
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highly speech-protective first amendment. He had followed Chafee's
roadmap, but he had neither adopted Chafee's civil libertarian position as
his own nor seriously contemplated the implications of an expansive
concept of free expression. Thus, when Holmes read a draft of
Brandeis's Gilbert dissent, Holmes told him, "I 
think you go too far.",
270
In fact, Holmes admitted that he originally planned to vote to uphold the
conviction in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company v.
271
Burleson; Brandeis persuaded him to dissent. If anything, Gilbert
illustrated a persistent difference between Brandeis and Holmes:
Brandeis largely agreed with the emerging civil libertarian position,
while Holmes was, at most, indifferent. Even though Holmes and
Brandeis managed to agree frequently on free-expression issues, they
held fundamentally different views on the potential for individual liberty
272
and societal progress. Not many years earlier, Holmes had written a
letter to John H. Wigmore, Dean of the Northwestern University School
of Law, that starkly revealed a cynical disregard for human life and
liberty. "[D]oesn't this squashy sentimentality of a big minority of our273
people about human life make you puke?" Holmes wrote. He then
specifically referred to people who condemn "the sensible doctor and
parents who don't perform an operation to keep a deformed and nearly
idiot baby alive-also of pacifists-of people who believe there is an
upward and onward-who talk of uplift-who think that something
particular has happened and that the universe is no longer predatory. Oh
bring in a basin. 274
Brandeis, as a general matter, expressed far more concern about
civil liberties and social progress. He concluded his Schaefer dissent
with a forewarning. "The jury which found men guilty for publishing
news items or editorials like those here in question must have supposed it
270. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1319.
271. 255 U.S. at 436-37 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Rabban, Emergence, supra
note 5, at 1319.
272. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND
THE INNER SELF 320-21 (1993) (comparing Holmes and Brandeis); see id at 333-53
(discussing Holmes's ambivalence toward civil liberties and Progressivism).
273. Polenberg, supra note 5, at 211 (quoting letter from Holmes to John
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to be within their province to condemn men not merely for disloyal acts
but for a disloyal heart; provided only that the disloyal heart was
evidenced by some utterance," Brandeis explained.275 "To prosecute
men for such publications reminds of the days when men were hanged
for constructive treason., 276 But Brandeis was more worried about the
future. "Nor will this grave danger end with the passing of the war ....
In peace, too, men may differ widely as to what loyalty to our country
demands; and an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may
be prone in the future, as it has often been in the past, to stamp as
disloyal opinions with which it disagrees., 277 One of Holmes's former
clerks would observe that "Brandeis feels sympathy for the oppressed,
Holmes contempt for the oppressor., 278 As such, Brandeis was more
committed than Holmes to a broad concept of free expression and more
thoughtful about the doctrine and theory. Unsurprisingly, then, unlike
Holmes, Brandeis recognized and openly admitted that his understanding
of free expression changed after the Court decided Schenck, Sugarman,
Frohwerk, and Debs.279
Regardless, Holmes's contributions to the transformation of free
expression should not be gainsaid. Through the World War I era and the
1920s, the majority of justices continued to resolve free-expression
issues in accord with republican democratic principles, finding that the
punishment of speech and writing with bad tendencies would promote
the common good. Following Chafee, Holmes and then Brandeis
imbued free expression with an enhanced social importance. All three
continued to understand free expression within republican democratic
parameters, but they argued that it deserved special gravity when
275. 251 U.S. at 493 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 494-95. For a discussion on Brandeis and civil liberties see
PHILIPPA STRUM, LouIs D. BRANDEIS 309-38 (1984).
278. Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1321; see Polenberg, supra note 5,
at 265-66 (emphasizing intellectual and personality differences between Holmes and
Brandeis); Rabban, Emergence, supra note 5, at 1322 (categorizing Brandeis as a
"postwar civil libertarian").
279. Brandeis explained to Frankfurter: "I have never been quite happy about
my concurrence in [the] Debs and Schenck cases. I had not then thought the issues
of freedom of speech out-I thought at the subject, not through it. Not until I came
to write the Pierce and Schaefer dissents did I understand it." Rabban, Emergence,
supra note 5, at 1329 (quoting Brandeis, Aug. 1921) (alteration added).
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determining the common good. In effect, the constitutional protection of
speech and writing itself became the common good, even if the
expression had bad tendencies. Most significantly, Holmes's Abrams
dissent was the first Supreme Court opinion to afford free expression
additional weight. The First Amendment should protect politically
unpopular expression, Holmes insisted, even if most Americans
(including the jurors) thought the expression harmful. Holmes's own
failure to recognize or admit his transformation does not diminish his
contribution to the eventual establishment of free expression as a
constitutional lodestar.
